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"THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE": THE NSA,
THE FISA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008, AND
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE OF
AMERICANS OVERSEAS
Jonathan D. Forgang*
In October 2008, two former National Security Agency communications
analysts told reporters that the NSA used satellite technology to monitor the
phone conversations of Americans living in the Middle East. This
revelation highlighted an unresolved area of surveillance law-the privacy
rights of US. citizens against their own government when they are outside
the borders of the United States. Though the FISA Amendments Act of 2008
has created a procedure for the judicial review of this type of surveillance,
this review is only a general oversight and judges on the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court are not required to individually review
every surveillance request.
This Note analyzes Fourth Amendment surveillance jurisprudence to
decide what level ofjudicial review is necessary, if any, before engaging in
surveillance of Americans overseas. First, this Note examines cases that
have discussed the reach of the Fourth Amendment to see if its protections
are available to Americans living outside the United States. Next, this Note
analyzes the recent Second Circuit decision In re Terrorist Bombings,
which held that the Fourth Amendment protects Americans overseas but
does not require a warrant. Then, this Note investigates whether, if a
warrant requirement does in fact exist, there is a 'foreign intelligence
exception" to this requirement. This Note concludes by deciding that the
Fourth Amendment requires U.S. intelligence agencies to obtain a specific
warrant before engaging in overseas surveillance ofAmerican citizens. To
enforce this requirement, this Note advocates for further amendments to
FISA, including a comprehensive and individualized warrant process that
protects both privacy and national security.
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INTRODUCTION
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. 1
On October 9, 2008, the ABC News program Nightline presented an
investigative report alleging that the National Security Agency (NSA)
monitored satellite phone talls between American civilians in the Middle
East and persons in the United States. 2  The report's most serious
allegations came from two former intelligence officers who worked in the
top secret NSA program "Highlander," 3 an NSA surveillance program that
monitors satellite phone transmissions on the Inmarsat network in the
Middle East.4 The two former Highlander analysts Adrienne Kinne and
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(dissenting from the majority's holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to
wiretapping cases where there is no physical trespass).
2. Brian Ross et al., Exclusive: Inside Account of U.S. Eavesdropping on Americans,
ABC NEWS, Oct. 9, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/Story?id=5987804. The report's
allegations focused on surveillance in Iraq, but the range of surveillance spreads over much
of the Middle East. See JAMES BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY: THE ULTRA-SECRET NSA
FROM 9/11 TO THE EAVESDROPPING ON AMERICA 129 (2008).
3. See BAMFORD, supra note 2, at 127-34 (describing the Highlander program).
4. See id. at 127. The Highlander program tracked terrorist groups such as al Qaeda.
Though Osama Bin Laden had stopped using his satellite phone by 2001, intelligence
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David Murfee Faulk claimed they listened to and recorded hundreds of
phone calls between American citizens in the Middle East and parties living
inside the United States. 5 Among these American citizens in the Middle
East were "US military officers, American journalists and American aid
workers."'6 The analysts alleged that this surveillance would often continue
even if the callers were American and there was no indication that the
conversations contained foreign intelligence, in violation of American
intelligence law. 7
In the years immediately prior to the start of the Highlander program, the
NSA had diligently avoided eavesdropping on Americans.8 Kinne alleged
that during her involvement in Highlander, however, the government
continued to monitor the calls even after the callers were identified as aid
organizations. 9 The allegations, if true, are the first time that anyone with
knowledge of the NSA's foreign surveillance operations has accused the
agency of spying on Americans overseas. President George W. Bush
previously disclosed, in 2005, that the government had approved a domestic
surveillance program as a part of its "War on Terror" and monitored suspect
overseas phone calls coming into the United States.' 0 However, Bush
claimed that the government limited this surveillance to known al Qaeda
officers believed that their surveillance might uncover communications by lower level al
Qaeda operatives still using the satellite technology. Id. at 127-28. At Camp Doha in
Kuwait, the National Security Agency (NSA) set up a mobile antenna to intercept
communications from the satellite Inmarsat 1-3 Fl. See id at 128. This interceptor antenna,
likened to a "vacuum cleaner in the sky," transmitted calls to a computer in the Highlander
unit where they were stored in a queue awaiting an analyst's review. See id.
5. See Ross et al., supra note 2. No other intelligence officers could corroborate the
former Highlander analysts' claims. Id. In fact, their supervisor John Berry says that
Highlander never illegally eavesdropped on Americans. He declined to say whether
Highlander ever monitored journalists, businesspeople, or humanitarians. See BAMFORD,
supra note 2, at 132. However, even if the claims are revealed to be untrue, this Note's core
inquiry will still be beneficial to understanding the Fourth Amendment's protection of
Americans living overseas.
6. See Ross et al., supra note 2.
7. See id. Executive Order 12,333, prior to recent amendments to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), was the only law governing surveillance of Americans
overseas and forbid surveillance when there was no probable cause that the surveillance
target was an agent of a foreign power. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, at 212
(1982), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (2006).
8. See BAMFORD, supra note 2, at 131-32.
9. See Ross et al., supra note 2. However, the U.S. government may have a justified
suspicion that charities are secretly aiding terrorist organizations. See Morning Edition:
Holy Land Convicted of Funneling Money to Hamas (NPR radio broadcast Nov. 25, 2008),
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=97439602 (describing a
Muslim charity's conviction for funneling money to Hamas). Adrienne Kinne also alleges
that the intercepted calls came from throughout the Middle East and not just the Iraq and
Afghanistan war zones. Posting of Kim Zetter to Threat Level,
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/1 0/kinne (Oct. 10, 2008, 15:06 EST).
10. See Dan Eggen, Bush Authorized Domestic Spying, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2005, at
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operatives or members of al Qaeda affiliated terrorist organizations calling
to or from the United States. 1'
National security surveillance like the Highlander program inevitably
invades the privacy of its monitored targets. This invasion is often justified
when it is necessary to protect American interests. There is little doubt that
the Highlander surveillance has greatly enhanced the safety of Americans.
Kinne and Faulk both claim that the surveillance helped the military disarm
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and preemptively capture dangerous
persons intending to harm U.S. servicemen in Iraq. 12 The United States
also used the surveillance to help assassinate one of the al Qaeda operatives
responsible for the USS Cole bombing.' 3
Despite these benefits, Kinne claims that the very utility of this type of
intelligence only emphasizes how much eavesdropping on aid workers and
other non-enemy combatants distracts intelligence officers from beneficial
intelligence gathering.14 The surveillance can have far-reaching negative
repercussions. The aid organizations that have been targeted by Highlander
claim that the surveillance requires them to "take burdensome and costly
measures" to protect confidentiality. 15  It also discourages clients,
journalistic sources, and victims of human rights abuses from sharing
sensitive information with journalists and aid organizations out of fear for
their own safety 16  and undermines the ethical responsibility of
confidentiality between humanitarian organizations and their clients.1 7
Answering these allegations, the Director of the NSA, Lieutenant
General Keith B. Alexander, said the agency acted with "respect for the
law." 18 The Fourth Amendment, 19 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA),20 Executive Order 12,333,21 and U.S. Signals Intelligence
Directive 18 (USSID 18)22 govern the NSA's electronic surveillance
11. President George W. Bush, Press Conference of the President of the United States
(Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB178/surv33a.pdf ("[T]his program is limited in nature to those that are known al
Qaeda ties and/or affiliates.").
12. See Ross et al., supra note 2.
13. See BAMFORD, supra note 2, at 135-36.
14. See Ross et al., supra note 2.
15. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 17, Amnesty Int'l USA v.
McConnell, No. 08-6259 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2008).
16. Id. at 26. Human Rights Watch is challenging the FISA Amendments Act of 2008
because it believes that the ease with which intelligence agencies may get approval to
conduct surveillance upon human rights groups in the Middle East will discourage many
potential clients from contacting them. Id.
17. Id. at27.
18. Ross et al., supra note 2.
19. See infra Part I.B.1.
20. See infra Part I.C.4-5.
21. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted as amended in 50
U.S.C. § 401 (2006).
22. Nat'l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., United States Signals Intelligence Directive 18
(July 27, 1993), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/07-
02.htm (declassified version with some language redacted). United States Signals
Intelligence Directive 18 (USSID 18) states that the NSA may not intentionally intercept
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activities. The Highlander surveillance draws attention to an unresolved
Fourth Amendment legal question about the surveillance of American
citizens living outside the United States. Specifically, there is a controversy
over whether the warrant requirement to the Fourth Amendment applies to
surveillance of American citizens overseas. 23 It is estimated that over six
million American citizens, including members of the military, live
overseas. 24 While many of the United States' greatest threats come from
abroad, government surveillance outside the country still affects the privacy
rights of a substantial number of Americans.
This Note explores the Fourth Amendment implications of warrantless
foreign intelligence surveillance of Americans overseas by looking at
statutes, cases, and scholarship about the surveillance approval
requirements both before and after the enactment of FISA. Part I of this
Note discusses the NSA's role in foreign and domestic security
surveillance, the history of American surveillance jurisprudence, and the
evolution of national security intelligence cases and statutes. Part II
examines the Fourth Amendment rights of Americans abroad, the debate
over whether there should be a warrant requirement for searches and
surveillance conducted on Americans overseas, and the merits of allowing a
foreign intelligence exception to a Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
In Part III, this Note decides whether a warrant should be required prior to
NSA surveillance, such as the kind allegedly conducted on American
civilians in the Middle East, and suggests a statutory solution for this type
of surveillance that protects the Fourth Amendment privacy rights of
American civilians overseas without compromising the United States'
national security.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. SURVEILLANCE LAW
In Part I, this Note provides background on NSA surveillance, the Fourth
Amendment, and surveillance law. Part I.A examines the history of the
NSA and its surveillance of American citizens. Next, Part I.B discusses the
Fourth Amendment and early surveillance law. Finally, Part I.C provides a
history of foreign surveillance statutes, cases, and history.
communications by Americans. See David Alan Jordan, Decrypting the Fourth Amendment:
Warrantless NSA Surveillance and the Enhanced Expectation of Privacy Provided by
Encrypted Voice over Internet Protocol, 47 B.C. L. REv. 505, 525-28 (2006) (providing
some background information on USSID 18). However, if the NSA intercepts the
communications of Americans "inadvertently" while trying to collect foreign
communications, the NSA may still retain those intercepted communications. Id. at 525-26.
23. See infra Part II.A.3.
24. See Ann Binlot, Why Is Voting Overseas So Difficult?, TIME, Nov. 1, 2008,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1855717,00.html (observing that nearly half
the six million Americans living overseas voted in the 2004 presidential election).
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A. The NSA and Electronic Surveillance
The NSA conducts foreign intelligence surveillance programs, like
Highlander, to guard the United States' national security. The NSA's
mission is to protect U.S. government information systems and
electronically gather foreign intelligence information. 25 The history of the
NSA begins during the Cold War when the Department of Defense created
the Armed Forces Security Agency, the immediate predecessor to the NSA,
in 1949.26 Two years later, a Senate committee responding to a need for
better coordination of communications intelligence recommended the
establishment of an intelligence agency with increased autonomy from the
armed forces. 27 In response to this recommendation, President Harry
Truman created the NSA in 1952.28
Because of the secretive nature of the NSA, the public knows little about
the agency's achievements. Some of the few publicized NSA successes
include the tracing of a Berlin disco bombing to a Libyan terrorist and the
monitoring of Soviet pilots that shot down a South Korean airliner in
1983.29 The agency's reputation soured after revelations surfaced in the
1970s of the NSA's illegal spying program on American citizens.30 In
response to this illegal surveillance, Congress passed FISA, creating a
warrant procedure for foreign intelligence surveillance of Americans and
prohibiting surveillance of any Americans that are not "agents of a foreign
power."3 1 After the passage of FISA, the NSA's leadership reportedly
became more cautious with their foreign intelligence surveillance out of
fear that they would inadvertently eavesdrop on Americans illegally.
32
Alongside other well-documented errors in coordination between
25. The NSA/CSS Mission, http://www.nsa.gov/about/mission/index.shtml (last visited
Sept. 10, 2009).
26. JAMES BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE 47 (1982). The Armed Forces Security
Agency analyzed foreign signals and delivered their work product to other United States
intelligence agencies. Id. at 51.
27. See The National Security Agency Declassified: History, Organization and
Operations, http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/ (last visited Sept. 10,
2009).
28. See BAMFORD, supra note 2, at 13, 168.
29. A Half-Century of Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A16; Eben Kaplan,
Council on Foreign Relations, Targeted Killings, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9627/ (last
visited Sept. 12, 2009) (describing President Ronald Regan's bombing of Libyan leader
Muammar el-Qaddafi's villa in response to intelligence that linked Libya to a Berlin disco
bombing); National Security Agency, http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/20th/nsa.html (last
visited Sept. 12, 2009) (stating that the NSA released intercepts from Soviet pilots that shot
down Korean Airlines flight 007).
30. See A Half-Century of Surveillance, supra note 29.
31. See id.
32. BAMFORD, supra note 2, at 31 (describing how known terrorists lived in San Diego
with a listed phone number but the NSA did not intercept their international
communications). But see NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ArACKS
UPON THE UNITED STATES 353 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 REPORT] (claiming the NSA listened
to international transmissions by known terrorists but failed to inquire further about the
threat they posed).
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intelligence agencies,33 journalist James Bamford implies that the NSA's
failure to detect the 9/11 terrorists living in the United States was directly
related to this overcaution. 34 To remedy this situation, President Bush
signed a secret order in 2002 allowing the NSA to conduct warrantless
surveillance of the e-mails and international phone calls of American
citizens believed to be contacting suspected terrorists. 35
With this executive authorization, the U.S. government subsequently
engaged in surveillance of Americans without seeking prior judicial
approval. 36 When this domestic NSA program came to light in 2006, the
press and public expressed outrage and questioned whether this surveillance
was a proper use of executive power.37 Some critics charged that the
President violated the law by circumventing FISA's surveillance approval
procedures. 38  Reports of the Highlander program's surveillance of
American citizens overseas surfaced in 2008 and raised similar questions
about the program's legality. 39
B. Fourth Amendment Electronic Surveillance Cases and Legislation
Part I.B of this Note provides some background on how electronic
surveillance has been regulated by Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and
statutes and informs the larger question this Note addresses. First, this
section examines Fourth Amendment jurisprudence generally. Then, it
traces the evolution of constitutional and statutory surveillance law.
33. See 9/11 REPORT, supra note 32, at 353-56 (finding that a lack of coordination
between American intelligence agencies allowed the 9/11 hijackers to operate in the U.S.
even after they had been detected by NSA intercepts).
34. BAMFORD, supra note 2, at 31-32.
35. See Eggen, supra note 10; James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on
Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al. Bush's secret order has never
been made public. See ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 687-88 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that
plaintiffs did not have standing to bring their claim and could not compel disclosure of the
secret order).
36. See, e.g., Eggen, supra note 10; Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 35.
37. See Editorial, An Ever-Expanding Secret, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2006, at A32 (urging
Congress to pass legislation declaring the NSA's warrantless domestic spying program
illegal); David Cole, NSA Spying Myths, THE NATION, Feb. 20, 2006, at 5, 5-7 (claiming that
wiretapping was outside the accepted powers of the President and that it was possible to
track terrorist groups without the NSA's domestic surveillance program); Jay Tolson,
Imbalance of Power: Just How Imperial Can the Commander in Chief Be During a Time of
Crisis?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 30-Feb. 6, 2006, at 58 (documenting the growing
concern with the Bush administration's expansion of executive power and noting prominent
American historical corollaries).
38. See ELIZABETH B. BAZAN & JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY To CONDUCT WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
To GATHER FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION 44 (2006), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m010506.pdf (finding that the legal justification given by
the Bush administration for the NSA surveillance was not well-grounded); Tom Daschle,
Op-Ed., Power We Didn't Grant, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2005, at A21 (rebutting the Bush
administration's claim that Congress authorized this type of surveillance in the United States
after 9/11).
39. See supra Introduction.
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1. The Fourth Amendment and Its Ambiguities
The Fourth Amendment states,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.4 0
Protecting the people's privacy, an essential part of the Fourth Amendment,
is an important component of a free society. 4 1 The Fourth Amendment,
deeply rooted in Anglo-American common law, protects against
unreasonable physical search and seizure.42 The Amendment's original
purpose was to protect homes and personal belongings from law
enforcement using general warrants; 4 3 however, courts have been debating
what protections the Fourth Amendment provides since its inception.4 4
One point of contention is whether there is a relationship between the
clause prohibiting unreasonable searches and the clause establishing the
conditions under which the government may issue warrants. 45 The U.S.
Supreme Court has held that a search without a warrant is generally
unreasonable, with some well-established exceptions such as when police
have probable cause or when there are exigent circumstances. 46 Other
Supreme Court decisions have implied, however, that a warrant is not
required at all and the Fourth Amendment only requires that a search be
reasonable. 4 7 The controversy continues because the Fourth Amendment
40. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
41. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949) (stating that protection from arbitrary
police intrusion into a person's home is at the core of the Fourth Amendment).
42. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 3-4 (3d ed. 1996) (explaining early cases in English search law that led to the
creation of the modem day Fourth Amendment).
43. J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95
GEO. L.J. 463, 518 (2007) (discussing the meaning of the phrase "the people" during a
historical analysis of United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)).
44. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 42, at 5; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757, 762-81 (1994) (comparing different interpretations of
the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause).
45. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 42, at 5.
46. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (stating that it remains a rule
that searches conducted without prior judicial approval are unreasonable unless they fit
within an exception); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (holding that it is a
"cardinal principle" that all searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable
unless subject to an exception); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (stating that
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless subject to an exception).
47. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1990) (stating that the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment can be supplanted by other elements that suggest the
search is "reasonable"); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (stating that the
essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to impose a reasonableness requirement on
searches); see also Amar, supra note 44, at 761 (claiming that the words of the Fourth
Amendment do not require warrants for searches and seizures); Constance Pfeiffer, Note,
Feeling Insecure?: United States v. Bin Laden and the Merits of a Foreign-Intelligence
2009]
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
does not explicitly state that the fruits of warrantless or unreasonable
searches and seizures must be barred as evidence in courts of law.48
Professor Akhil Reed Amar has written that both the exclusionary rule and
the warrant requirement are not valid because the Fourth Amendment at the
time of its adoption did not explicitly require warrants, probable cause, or
the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. 49 The justification for this
view is that the actual text of the Fourth Amendment does not require a
warrant, stating only that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause." 50 Instead of a warrant requirement, Amar believes that the Fourth
Amendment's text only requires that a search is reasonable. 51 According to
Amar, the warrant requirement to the Fourth Amendment is a purely
modem invention.52
The Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly reaffirmed that there is a
warrant requirement in the Fourth Amendment. 53 In his historical analysis
of the Fourth Amendment, Professor Thomas Davies asserts that
commentators on both sides of the debate have used historical commentary
to support their assertions, yet the actual historical evidence does not
corroborate either the reasonableness or the warrant requirement
interpretations. 54  While neither approach exactly comports with the
original intent of the Fourth Amendment, Davies believes that the warrant
preference interpretation comes closest to the original vision of the
Framers. 55 The Framers had a clear preference for specific warrants as a
way to reduce the discretionary search authority of law enforcement
Exception for Searches Abroad, 23 REv. LITIG. 209, 215 (2004) (stating that the Fourth
Amendment only requires reasonableness and not a warrant); Corey M. Then, Note,
Searches and Seizures of Americans Abroad: Re-Examining the Fourth Amendment's
Warrant Clause and the Foreign Intelligence Exception Five Years After United States v.
Bin Laden, 55 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1062-63 (2006) (observing that the text of the Fourth
Amendment does not actually require warrants).
48. However, the U.S. Supreme Court established that the product of an illegal search
may not be admitted as evidence in a legal proceeding. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 398 (1914).
49. See Amar, supra note 44, at 757 (stating that a close reading of the text and history
of the Bill of Rights does not support the modem reading of the Fourth Amendment).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Amar, supra note 44, at 758.
51. Amar, supra note 44, at 759.
52. See id. at 757 (stating that the modem pillars of the Fourth Amendment do not match
the text and history of the Amendment).
53. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (stating that searches
conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (stating that the warrant requirement is the "most basic
constitutional rule" in Fourth Amendment law); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-
15 (1948) (stating that a warrant is always required unless there are exceptional
circumstances).
54. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv.
547, 551, 736 (1999). Professor Thomas Davies has written extensively about the Framers'
intent during the drafting of the Bill of Rights, particularly the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments. See The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, College of Law, Thomas Y.
Davies, http://www.law.utk.edu/faculty/davies/publications.shtml (last visited Sept. 11,
2009).
55. Davies, supra note 54, at 738.
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personnel. 56 However, no matter which approach is the closest to the
original intent of the Fourth Amendment, over time the warrant procedure
has proven to be an important way for an impartial party to weigh the
benefit of a search against the cost of the intrusion on a citizen's privacy.
57
2. The Supreme Court's Earliest Electronic Surveillance Decisions
and the Congressional Response
The Supreme Court had to struggle to determine whether it could apply
the law of searches to law enforcement electronic surveillance. The
application of Fourth Amendment doctrine to electronic surveillance began
with the Supreme Court's 1928 decision in Olmstead v. United States.58 In
Olmstead, the Court held that warrantless wiretapping does not violate the
Fourth Amendment because the U.S. Constitution only protected against
warrantless searches of a person, a home, or personal possessions. 59 The
petitioners in Olmstead had appealed their conviction for conspiracy to
transport, import, and sell liquor in violation of the National Prohibition
Act.60 Federal prohibition officers obtained most of the information leading
to the petitioners' arrest by intercepting phone conversations between the
coconspirators. 61  These wiretaps did not occur inside any of the
petitioners' homes and did not necessitate law enforcement trespass.
62
The Court's majority held that the Fourth Amendment did not require a
warrant for nontrespassory electronic surveillance and rejected any notion
that the Fourth Amendment protected against anything but a physical search
of a spatially limited area, such as a house or person.63 Justice Louis
Brandeis dissented, stating that the Constitution should be able to protect
privacy even after technological advances make possible previously
unfathomable invasions of privacy. 64 Wiretapping made the government
capable of "[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy," so
that it was possible "to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in
56. See id
57. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963) ("The arrest warrant
procedure serves to insure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be
interposed between the citizen and the police ...."); Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14 ("Any
assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to
issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would
reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the
discretion of police officers.") (footnote omitted).
58. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
59. Id. at 466.
60. Id. at 455.
61. See id at 456-57.
62. See id. at 457 (finding that police intercepted the phone calls from telephone lines in
the street near the house).
63. Id. at 464-65 ("The language of the Amendment cannot be extended and expanded
to include telephone wires reaching to the whole world from the defendant's house or
office.").
64. See id. at 472-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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the closet."'65  Instead of focusing on the literal trespass to physical
property, Brandeis argued that the Fourth Amendment fundamentally
protected against "the invasion... of personal security, personal liberty and
private property. '66
Despite Brandeis's impassioned dissent, the Olmstead majority allowed
federal agencies to use warrantless wiretaps in criminal and intelligence
investigations. 67 Congress responded to Olmstead by passing § 605 of the
Federal Communications Act of 1934, making it a crime for any person to
intercept wire or radio communications and then divulge or publish the
contents of those communications. 68  Courts interpreted this law as
prohibiting the introduction of information procured from warrantless
wiretaps into evidence. 69 In Nardone v. United States,70 the Supreme Court
interpreted the Federal Communications Act as also applying to federal
agents and held that evidence obtained in contravention of the Act was
inadmissible. 71 This legislation, however, did not address the validity of
wiretaps in the name of national security.72
3. Katz v. United States and its Effect on Electronic Surveillance Law
In Katz v. United States, 73 the Supreme Court finally held that electronic
surveillance is subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 74 The
65. Id. at 473.
66. See id at 474-75.
67. DONALD J. MUSCH, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
ACT 5 (2003).
68. Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103-04 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §
605(a) (2006)).
69. See, e.g., Nardone v. United States (Nardone 1), 302 U.S. 379, 385 (1937) (holding
that the fruits of illegal wiretapping must be excluded as evidence at trial); Zweibon v.
Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("Section 605 was interpreted to prohibit the
introduction into evidence of . . .conversations overheard on wiretaps installed by law
enforcement officials ...."); United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 636 (2d Cir. 1950)
(holding that wiretapping is illegal and evidence retrieved by illegal means must be excluded
at trial).
70. 302 U.S. 379.
71. Id. at 382-83 (holding that information obtained in contravention of § 605 of the
Federal Communications Act is inadmissible in court); Nardone v. United States (Nardone
11), 308 U.S. 338, 343 (1939) (holding, after remand, that both of the intercepted
transmissions were inadmissible, as well as any other evidence procured through knowledge
gained from the illegally intercepted transmissions).
72. Brenton Hund, Note, Disappearing Safeguards: FISA Nonresident Alien
"Loophole" Is Unconstitutional, 15 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 169, 177 (2007)
(describing the congressional and executive response to surveillance laws passed after
Olmstead).
73. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
74. Id. at 359. By the time that Katz was decided, the underpinnings of Olmstead had
been "eroded" by subsequent decisions. See id. at 353. Courts no longer saw property
interest as controlling the government's right to search. See Warden, Md. Penitentiary v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) (holding that a search may be unreasonable even if the
government has a superior interest in the searched property at common law). The Court had
also previously held that the Fourth Amendment applied to the recording of oral statements
without any physical trespass. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)
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petitioner, Charles Katz, appealed his conviction for illegal gambling in
violation of the Federal Wire Wager Act.75 Katz allegedly used a public
phone in Los Angeles to place bets in Miami and Boston.76 Katz's primary
argument on appeal was that the police obtained recordings of his phone
conversations by means that violated the Fourth Amendment. 77 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument because the
recordings were made by an electronic listening device placed on the
exterior of the phone booth used by Katz.78
Prior Fourth Amendment surveillance cases, most prominently Olmstead,
were based on a theory of physical trespass. 79 In Katz, the Supreme Court
departed from this rationale, holding that what a person "preserve[s] as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected." 80 Therefore, the fact that the listening device did not physically
penetrate the booth where the defendant made the call had "no
constitutional significance." 81
Congress supported the Katz decision by passing Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III) one year later.8 2
Title III protects private communications from warrantless electronic
surveillance by prohibiting electronic surveillance by private citizens and
authorizing law enforcement only to use surveillance pursuant to a court
order.8 3  Title III explicitly did not affect the legality of warrantless
(holding that violations of real property law are not a prerequisite to invoking Fourth
Amendment rights).
75. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 348-49.
78. See Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 133-34 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
79. See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1942) (holding that use
of a detectaphone was not a trespass and therefore it did not violate the Fourth Amendment);
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457 (1928) (finding that the surveillance occurred
without any trespass on the target's property); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
31 (2001) (noting that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common law trespass
well into the twentieth century).
80. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
81. See id. at 353.
82. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-35 1, tit. III, 82
Stat. 197, 211-25 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2006)); H.R. REP. No. 95-1283,
pt. 1, at 17 (1978), available at http://www.cnss.org/rpt%2095-1283ptl.pdf. The U.S.
Department of Justice had been pressing for legislation removing the limitations of § 605 of
the Federal Communications Act in order to use electronic surveillance to combat crime. See
United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 598-60 (3d Cir. 1974) (describing the history of
interpretation of § 605 of the Federal Communications Act).
83. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2006); Frederick M. Joyce & Andrew E. Bigart, Liability for
All, Privacy for None: The Conundrum of Protecting Privacy Rights in a Pervasively
Electronic World, 41 VAL. U. L. REv. 1481, 1486 (2007); Authorization of Applications for
Wire, Oral, and Electronic Interception Orders-Overview and History of Legislation,
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia reading_room/usam/title9/7mcrm.htm#9-7.100 (last
visited Sept. 11, 2009). In order to adapt to new computer and telecommunications
technologies, Congress later passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,
which extended wiretap protections to cellular phones, while continuing to provide the same
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surveillance conducted for national security purposes.84 Section 2511(3) of
the Act stated that nothing in Title III or the Federal Communications Act
limited
the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he
deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or
other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence
information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to
protect national security information against foreign intelligence
activities. 85
Title III, therefore, only applied to domestic electronic surveillance, but not
national security surveillance, and "ha[d] no extraterritorial force." 86 It also
incorporated a statutory exigent circumstances exception for state and
federal authorities during an emergency, contingent upon law enforcement
entering an application for the surveillance within forty-eight hours. 87
Thus, by 1968, domestic surveillance law offered protection from arbitrary
law enforcement intrusions but did not govern the activities of intelligence
agencies engaging in national security surveillance.
C. A Brief History ofAmerican Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law
In Part I.C, this Note reviews the constitutional and statutory restrictions
on foreign intelligence surveillance of Americans. This Note first discusses
the President's constitutional power to engage in foreign intelligence
surveillance and examines the history of executive authorization of national
security surveillance. Next, this Note provides a summary of the events
that led to the passage of FISA and that Act's requirements, procedures, and
implications for foreign surveillance law. Finally, this Note summarizes the
recent FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and briefly discusses how this Act
has changed FISA procedures and protections.
essential protections found in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 (Title III). See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848, 1860-73 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2006)).
84. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1976), repealed by Act of Oct. 25, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
511, § 201(c), 92 Stat. 1783, 1797.
85. Id. James Bamford contends that the NSA helped write Title III and inserted this
provision "to remove any doubt as to the legality" of the NSA's operations. BAMFORD, supra
note 26, at 256 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting a July 24, 1968 memorandum
written by NSA lawyer Roy Banner).
86. See United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (holding that it is undisputed that Title III does not apply outside of the
United States).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7)(a)-(b) (2006). Acceptable emergencies under Title III include
immediate death or injury to a person, national security threats, and organized crime
conspiracies. Id.
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1. The President's Constitutional Authority To Engage in Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance
Under Article II of the Constitution, the President of the United States
has the duty to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States." 88 Courts and commentators have interpreted this clause to mean
that the President as Commander-in-Chief has the authority under the
foreign affairs power to gather intelligence to protect the country.89
However, the Supreme Court has never expressly decided whether the
President has the power to authorize foreign intelligence surveillance
without prior judicial approval.90 Nevertheless, most of the lower courts
that have heard this issue have held that the executive branch has the
inherent power to use warrantless surveillance to gather foreign
intelligence. 9 1
2. Executive Authorization of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Progressively, from 1931 until the passage of FISA in 1978, the standard
for executive approval of national security surveillance changed from only
using surveillance to combat serious crimes to the subjective criterion that
surveillance should only be used for the "national interest. '92 In 1931,
Attorney General William D. Mitchell approved telephone wiretapping by
the government when "the crimes are substantial and serious." 93 After the
Nardone decisions held that this type of warrantless surveillance was
illegal, 94  the U.S. Department of Justice interpreted the Federal
Communications Act to mean that only divulgence of wire and radio
surveillance was illegal. 95 According to the Justice Department's rationale,
88. U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 1, cl. 8.
89. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 15-21 (1978); see also United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-22 (1936) (stating that the President is the "sole organ
of the federal government in the field of international relations"); Hund, supra note 72, at
174 (asserting that the "Oath Clause" vests the President's right to engage in wiretapping).
90. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 15 (1978) (noting that the Justice Department
believed that the Federal Communications Act did not impede the executive's inherent
ability to use intelligence to defend the nation in national security matters); United States v.
U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 310 (1972) (stating that in order to preserve and
protect the country, the President may choose whether or not to use electronic surveillance).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980)
(holding that a warrant requirement would "unduly frustrate the efforts of Government to
protect itself' (quoting Keith, 407 U.S. at 315)); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426
(5th Cir. 1973) (holding that the President has the power to conduct warrantless foreign
intelligence surveillance). But see Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(stating that even though the practice of executive authorization of warrantless surveillance
for national security purposes has been used by Presidents since Roosevelt, unconstitutional
practices should not be condoned by the judiciary).
92. H.R. REP.No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 15-21 (1978).
93. See id. at 15.
94. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
95. H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 15 (1978).
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the government could conduct warrantless national security electronic
surveillance if it only examined the resulting intelligence internally. 96
Subsequent Attorneys General similarly approved this type of
surveillance. In a memo to Attorney General Robert Jackson in 1940,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized national security surveillance
but requested that Jackson use these investigations sparingly and to "limit
them insofar as possible to aliens." 97 In a 1946 memorandum to President
Harry Truman, Attorney General Tom C. Clark reiterated the necessity of
domestic surveillance in "cases vitally affecting the domestic security. 98
In the early 1950s, President Truman's subsequent Attorney General, J.
Howard McGrath, decided that the Justice Department would not approve
or authorize national security telephone surveillance that required physical
trespass. 99  However, in 1954 during President Dwight Eisenhower's
administration, Attorney General Herbert Brownell wrote in a
memorandum that the FBI had broad discretion to use even trespassory
electronic surveillance in the "national interest" without approval from the
Justice Department.100  In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson wrote a
memorandum voicing his disapproval of the interception of phone
conversations "except in connection with investigations related to the
national security."' 1 1  By this time, warrantless national security
surveillance seemed to have become an accepted executive prerogative.
The Supreme Court remained silent on the legality of this surveillance
because Katz, while applying the Fourth Amendment to electronic
surveillance, refused to extend its holding to national security
surveillance. 10 2 The Court seemed split on this issue. Justice William 0.
Douglas stated in his concurrence in Katz that he did not "agree that where
spies and saboteurs are involved adequate protection of Fourth Amendment
rights is assured when the President and Attorney General assume both the
position of adversary-and-prosecutor and disinterested, neutral
magistrate."'1 3 Justice Byron White, in a separate concurrence, disagreed,
stating that warrantless wiretapping in the name of national security should
be allowed if the President or his Attorney General found that the
96. Id; see also Herbert Brownell, Jr., The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39
CORNELL L.Q. 195, 197-98 (1954); William P. Rogers, The Case for Wire Tapping, 63 YALE
L.J. 792, 793 (1954).
97. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Appendix A:
Memorandum from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Attorney General Robert Jackson).
98. Id. (Appendix A: Memorandum from Attorney General Tom C. Clark to President
Harry S. Truman).
99. H.R. REP.No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 16 (1978).
100. Id.
101. Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 674-75 (Appendix A: Memorandum for the Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies from President Lyndon Johnson).
102. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.23 (1967) ("Whether safeguards other
than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation
involving the national security is a question not presented by this case.").
103. Id. at 360 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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surveillance was reasonable. 104 There was no clear consensus whether the
Katz holding applied to national security surveillance.
3. Changes in Domestic National Security Surveillance Law
Restrictions on the government power to conduct intelligence
surveillance of Americans increased during the 1970s in response to the
Supreme Court's application of the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement to domestic national security surveillance in United States v.
U.S. District Court (Keith).10 5 In Keith, the petitioners appealed their
conviction for conspiring to destroy government buildings, including the
CIA office in Ann Arbor, Michigan. 10 6 Although it did not have prior
judicial approval, the government claimed that the surveillance evidence
used in the prosecution was lawful because it was a reasonable exercise of
presidential power to protect national security. 10 7  Specifically, the
government asserted that Title III did not control the government's conduct
because § 2511(3) of Title III stated that nothing in the Act disturbed power
given to the President by the Constitution to protect the country. 10 8
Though the government was invoking the same rationale that the
executive had used for years to justify warrantless surveillance, the Court
held that, even if domestic national security surveillance is reasonably
executed, the Fourth Amendment still requires prior judicial approval. 10 9
According to the Court, "[s]ecurity surveillances are especially sensitive
because of the inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept, the
necessarily broad and continuing nature of intelligence gathering, and the
temptation to utilize such surveillances to oversee political dissent." 10 The
Court was careful to emphasize that its holding would not address foreign
intelligence surveillance."I ' It limited its ruling to national security
electronic surveillance of domestic subjects and not "the issues which may
be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents." '"12
The Court merely "narrowed the scope of the possible exception to the
warrant requirement" when responding to a domestic security threat. "13
104. See id. at 364 (White, J., concurring).
105. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
106. See id. at 299.
107. See id. at 301.
108. See id. at 302 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (2006)).
109. See id. at 317.
110. Id. at 320.
111. See id. at 308-09.
112. Seeid. at 322.
113. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (finding that the Court did
not answer the national security surveillance question until United States v. U.S. District
Court (Keith)).
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4. Enactment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
After years of abstention from foreign intelligence surveillance matters,
Congress finally decided in 1975 to examine the practices of the
intelligence agencies after revelations surfaced of surveillance abuses
against American citizens. 114 Journalist Seymour M. Hersh had revealed
that the CIA was conducting illegal surveillance of thousands of American
citizens.115 The Watergate investigation had also uncovered evidence that
President Richard Nixon authorized electronic surveillance in the name of
national security to monitor the international communications of Americans
involved in domestic dissent such as civil rights activists, student groups,
and Vietnam War protest groups. 116 A committee led by Senator Frank
Church convened to conduct a study of intelligence operations to see if the
U.S. government engaged in any illegal or improper surveillance of
American citizens.117  The Church Committee conducted a thorough
examination of intelligence operations in the United States and found that
intelligence agents and members of the executive branch often ignored the
statutory checks that were in place to prevent abuses of national security
surveillance. 18
In response to the Church Committee's report, Congress addressed the
need for balance between national security interests and civil liberties
protections with FISA. 119 A guiding principle of FISA is that even if the
President has an inherent constitutional power to authorize foreign
intelligence surveillance, Congress may regulate this activity by requiring a
reasonable warrant procedure. 120 FISA governed acquisition by electronic
surveillance of any wire communication to or from a party in the United
States when neither party had consented to the surveillance. 121 The Act
authorized the executive branch to conduct electronic surveillance when "a
significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence
information."1 22 FISA also amended § 2511(3) of Title III to unequivocally
state that FISA was the exclusive means of conducting any type of foreign
intelligence surveillance that targeted Americans. 123
114. Church Committee Created, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/
Church-CommitteeCreated.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2009).
115. Id.; Seymour M. Hersh, Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar
Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1974, at Al.
116. S. REP. No. 94-755, at (3)(b) (1976), available at
http://www.icdc.com/-paulwolf/cointelpro/churchfinalreportlla.htm.
117. See Church Committee Created, supra note 114.
118. Id. (stating that the committee interviewed 800 individuals, conducted 250 executive
hearings, and held 21 public hearings); see Heidi Kitrosser, "'Macro- Transparency" as
Structural Directive: A Look at the NSA Surveillance Controversy, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1163,
1184 (2007) (describing the Church Committee's findings of surveillance abuses).
119. See MUSCH, supra note 67, at 9; Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-85c (2006)).
120. H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 24 (1978).
121. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(2) (2006).
122. Id. § 1804(a)(7)(B).
123. MUSCH, supra note 67, at 94.
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FISA defined "foreign intelligence information" as information related to
national security, foreign affairs, or potential attacks by "a foreign power"
or "agents of a foreign power."' 124 The Act only protected "United States
person[s]," defined as U.S. citizens, resident aliens, and certain corporations
and unincorporated organizations, from surveillance. 125 A violation of
FISA, by engaging in warrantless electronic surveillance or disclosing
information obtained from electronic surveillance, was punishable by up to
$10,000 in fines and five years in prison. 126 FISA also empowered
individuals targeted by illegal surveillance to bring civil claims for actual
damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees. 1
27
Congress created the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), a
secret panel of eleven federal judges chosen by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, to review FISA warrant requests. 128 Prior to the most
recent FISA amendments, 129 the process for requesting a FISA warrant
required an intelligence agency or police department to submit a warrant
application to the Justice Department.130 This application had to describe
the proposed surveillance or search, certify that the surveillance was for
foreign intelligence purposes, and include a certification by the President or
his designated official that the surveillance was for foreign intelligence
information that could not be obtained by more traditional means. 13 1 The
Justice Department then reviewed the application before submitting it to the
FISC. 132 If an application met all of these requirements and there was
probable cause, a FISC judge could then issue a warrant. 133 This warrant
specifically stated information such as the target, "nature and location," and
duration of the surveillance. 134  FISA also allowed for emergency
124. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e).
125. Id. § 1801(i).
126. Id. § 1809.
127. Id. § 1810.
128. Id. § 1803(a) ("The Chief Justice of the United States shall publicly designate 11
district court judges from seven of the United States judicial circuits of whom no fewer than
3 shall reside within 20 miles of the District of Columbia who shall constitute a court which
shall have jurisdiction to hear applications for and grant orders approving electronic
surveillance anywhere within the United States ...."). Originally, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC) had only seven judges. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (1982), amended
by 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009). The Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
(USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 increased the number of judges on the FISC to eleven. See
Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 207, 115 Stat. 272, 283 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered titles
and sections of the U.S.C.).
129. See infra Part I.C.5.
130. Hund, supra note 72, at 181.
131. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7) (2006); see also Hund, supra note 72, at 181.
132. Pfeiffer, supra note 47, at 224.
133. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a). FISA is a much more lenient standard than Title III because
national security surveillance under FISA requires a lesser showing of probable cause than
Title III. See Ronald J. Sievert, Meeting the Twenty-First Century Terrorist Threat Within
the Scope of Twentieth Century Constitutional Law, 37 Hous. L. REv. 1421, 1438 (2001).
134. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)-(d). If the location of surveillance was unknown or was likely
to change frequently, the applicant was required to provide information about the location of
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exceptions to the warrant requirement in two situations. First, the Attorney
General could authorize warrantless surveillance in an emergency where
obtaining a warrant prior to commencing surveillance was not possible. 135
If surveillance began under this emergency exception, the Attorney General
had to apply for a warrant within seventy-two hours of authorizing the
surveillance. 136 Under the second emergency exception, the Attorney
General could authorize electronic surveillance without a warrant for fifteen
days after a declaration of war by Congress. 137
Many commentators believe that FISA has been a successful legislative
solution to the foreign intelligence question left by the Keith decision. 138
Every circuit court that has queried whether FISA is an adequate safeguard
for U.S. persons' Fourth Amendment rights has upheld the Act. 139 Critics
have responded, however, that in practice FISA has not been a sufficient
check on administrative requests for surveillance warrants. 140 For instance,
records show that from 1979 to 2002 the FISC did not reject any FISA
applications, though it has rejected nine applications since 2003.141 In
the surveillance within ten days of the beginning of the surveillance in each particular
location. Id. § 1805(c)(3).
135. Id. § 1805(f).
136. Id.
137. Id. § 1811. The Attorney General could also authorize electronic surveillance of a
foreign power as long as there was not a "substantial likelihood" that the surveillance would
investigate a U.S. person. Id. §§ 1802(a)(1)(B), 1822(a)(l)(A)(ii). However, all intelligence
obtained from this surveillance had to be submitted to a FISC judge immediately for review.
Id. § 1802(a)(3).
138. Curtis A. Bradley et al., February 2, 2006 Letter from Scholars and Former
Government Officials to Congressional Leadership in Response to Justice Department
Whitepaper of January 19, 2006, 81 IND. L.J. 1415, 1423 (2006) (stating that FISA has been
used successfully for thirty years); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REv.
101, 159 (2008) (stating that FISA has been a successful answer to the Keith question); Juan
P. Valdivieso, Recent Developments: Protect America Act of 2007, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
581, 589 (2008) (stating that FISA contributed to successes against al Qaeda after 9/11).
139. See United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that FISA
meets constitutional requirements because it reasonably fulfills government surveillance
needs and protects citizens' rights); United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 73 (2d Cir. 1984)
(holding that FISA is a constitutionally adequate balance of Fourth Amendment rights and
the government needs for foreign intelligence surveillance).
140. Martha Minow, What Is the Greatest Evil?, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2134, 2154 (2005)
(book review) (stating that the FISC has provided no check on administrative requests for
surveillance warrants).
141. See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Orders 1979-
2007, http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa-stats.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2009).
But see Stephen J. Schulhofer, The New World of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 17
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 531, 535 (2006) (stating that various post-9/l 1 inquiries into the
FISA process indicate that the review procedure is far more rigorous than the low rejection
numbers imply). After 9/11, the number of FISA applications increased dramatically.
Valerie Caproni, Surveillance and Transparency, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1087, 1092
(2007) (stating that after 9/11 the number of FISA requests doubled from the pre-9/11
levels). The government response to the terrorist strikes against the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon created a significant increase in the amount of foreign intelligence needed by
U.S. military and intelligence services. See id. Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act in
part to facilitate easier foreign intelligence approval by amending FISA to only require that
foreign intelligence information is a "significant purpose" for the surveillance rather than its
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2007, out of 2371 applications, the FISC only denied four and made
substantive modifications to an additional eighty-six warrant requests.' 42
Even with such a high approval rate, Congress has further eased FISA
requirements in the past decade.
5. Enactment of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008
In 2006, after the U.S. government revealed that it had engaged in
warrantless surveillance of American citizens, 143 a civil liberties group
called the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) sued the
telecommunications company AT&T for assisting the NSA in conducting
surveillance of its customers.l4 4 Senator John Rockefeller proposed FISA
amendments that would grant retroactive immunity to telecommunications
companies that assisted the NSA in warrantless surveillance of
Americans. 145 The proponents of the bill argued that telecommunications
companies should not be punished for assisting the government in its fight
against terrorism. 146 Senators Russ Feingold and Christopher J. Dodd
opposed the bill, arguing that it rewarded telecommunications companies
for violating the law and betraying the privacy of their customers. 147
Despite this dissent, the bill passed and President Bush signed the FISA
Amendments Act of 2008 into law on July 10, 2008.148
An important addition to FISA under this Act was its expansion of
FISA's coverage to include surveillance of Americans living overseas. 149
Under § 702(b) of FISA, the government may not "intentionally target a
United States person reasonably believed to be located outside the United
"primary purpose." Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered titles and sections of U.S.C.); see In
re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 732-34 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (holding that Congress intended
to relax the standard of what the government had to show to get a FISA warrant); William
Pollak, Note, Shu'ubiyya or Security?: Preserving Civil Liberties by Limiting FISA
Evidence to National Security Prosecutions, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 221, 237-38 (2008)
(stating that only six weeks after 9/11, President Bush signed the USA PATRIOT Act,
changing FISA's reqdirements).
142. See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., supra note 141.
143. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
144. John Markoff & Scott Shane, Documents Show Link Between AT&T and Agency in
Eavesdropping Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2006, at A17.
145. S. 2248, 1 10th Cong. (2007), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query
/z?cl 10:S.2248.RS:.
146. Editorial, Compromising the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2008, at A20.
147. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (to be codified
in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 50 U.S.C.); Eric Lichtblau, Senate Votes for Expansion of
Spy Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2008, at A17.
148. Eric Lichtblau, Senate Approves Bill To Broaden Wiretap Powers, N.Y. TIMES, July
10, 2008, at Al.
149. Executive Order 12,333 previously gave the Attorney General the power to approve
surveillance in any case where there is probable cause that the subject is an agent of a
foreign power. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 212 (1982), reprinted as amended in
50 U.S.C. § 401 (2006).
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States."150 Previously there was no procedure for obtaining a warrant for
surveillance of Americans overseas because magistrate judges had no
extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. 151  By placing Americans overseas under FISA, Congress
created a procedure for protecting the privacy of all Americans subject to
foreign intelligence surveillance.
Though this legislation resolved a long-disputed area of surveillance law,
other controversial modifications to FISA in the Act overshadowed this
change. Under the new amendments, the Attorney General does not need to
specifically identify surveillance targets. 152 Instead, the Attorney General
only needs to provide a "written certification" that the targets are outside
the United States. 153 The amended FISA also no longer requires the FISC
to consider individual surveillance applications and instead the court only
oversees whether intelligence agency surveillance adheres to FISA's
general procedural requirements.154 These changes removed previous FISA
requirements that required intelligence agencies to submit detailed
information about the nature of the information sought and describing the
person or place targeted in order to receive a warrant for that specific
surveillance. 155
The new amendments also provide the government greater flexibility to
conduct foreign intelligence surveillance with no warrant at all. It expanded
the executive's discretion to use warrantless surveillance under exigent
circumstances to situations where information important to "national
security" may be lost.156 Under the amended FISA, even if the FISC denies
a warrant request, intelligence agencies are allowed to conduct surveillance
until a decision is made on appeal. 157 Critics of the Act have argued that
the amendments weakened FISA and do not provide adequate judicial
oversight. 158 President Bush claimed, however, that it was a necessary
change to FISA to assist the intelligence agencies in fighting terrorism.' 59
150. 50 U.S.C.A. § 188 1a(b)(3) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009).
151. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b); see also United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264,
275-76 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that there is not a statutory provision for searches
conducted overseas), aff'd sub nom. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr.
(Fourth Amendment Challenges), 552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008).
152. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(g)(4).
153. Id. § 1881a(g).
154. Id. § 188la(i)(2).
155. See 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (2006).
156. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(c)(2).
157. Id. § 1881a(i)(4)(B).
158. Editorial, supra note 146 (arguing that the bill "dangerously weakened" FISA); Press
Release, American Civil Liberties Union, H.R. 6304, The FISA Amendments Act of 2008
(June 19, 2008), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/nsaspying/35731res20080619.html (claiming
that the bill gives "sweeping wiretapping authority to the government with little court
oversight").
159. See George W. Bush, U.S. President, Address in the Rose Garden, available at
http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/nss/WHJ20080710-2.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2009)
(stating that the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 gives intelligence agencies "the tools they
need to protect our country").
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Whether it is a benefit or not, the Act removed the individualized judicial
review of the original FISA and replaced it with a system that emphasized
efficient warrant approval based on reliance on the good faith of the
executive. 160 This Note examines whether the Fourth Amendment requires
a more rigorous review of warrant applications for surveillance of
Americans overseas.
II. SHOULD COURTS REQUIRE WARRANTS PRIOR TO SURVEILLANCE OF
AMERICANS OVERSEAS?
With foreign travel and working overseas more commonplace,
Americans often spend time in foreign nations. It is a matter of some
debate whether Americans should enjoy the same protection from
surveillance when they are overseas as they do while within the borders of
the United States. Part II examines whether the Fourth Amendment
requires prior judicial approval before the U.S. government conducts
surveillance of Americans living overseas. Part IL.A is a comparison of
cases deciding whether the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement applies
to U.S. persons when they are outside the United States. Part IL.B is an in-
depth analysis of whether, if a warrant requirement in fact exists, there
should be a foreign intelligence exception to this warrant requirement for
surveillance of Americans overseas.
A. Applying the Fourth Amendment Overseas: A Possible
Warrant Requirement
In Part II.A, this Note examines whether the Fourth Amendment is
applicable to U.S. persons abroad. First, this Note examines whether the
Fourth Amendment's protections are available to Americans living
overseas. Next, it discusses the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement
and whether it is applicable to foreign intelligence surveillance of
Americans overseas.
1. Fourth Amendment Protections for Americans Overseas
There is no Supreme Court decision explicitly holding that the Fourth
Amendment protects Americans living overseas. 161 However, in Reid v.
Covert,162 a plurality of the Supreme Court held that the Constitution
generally applies to American citizens living abroad.' 63 In Reid, a military
tribunal convicted a woman of killing her husband while they were both
160. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
161. See Pfeiffer, supra note 47, at 215 (discussing the warrant requirement abroad and
stating that "the Supreme Court has never directly considered the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment" to searches of Americans overseas).
162. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
163. 1d. at 5-6 (plurality opinion) (holding that civilians abroad may not be
constitutionally tried by military authorities).
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stationed at a U.S. Air Force base in England.' 64 The United States had
signed a treaty with the British government giving the U.S. military
exclusive criminal jurisdiction over American servicemen and their
dependents stationed in Great Britain. 165 The convicted woman appealed
her conviction by a military tribunal on the grounds that, as a civilian, the
Constitution forbade her trial by military authorities. 166 A plurality of the
Court agreed, holding that the Constitution applies to American citizens
living overseas and that "the shield which the Bill of Rights
provide[s] . . . should not be stripped away just because [Americans]
happen[] to be in another land."'167 Justice John Marshall Harlan II, in his
concurrence, conceded that the protections of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments should sometimes be available to criminal defendants
overseas but disagreed with the plurality opinion's assertion that all the
provisions of the Constitution are "automatically applicable to American
citizens in every part of the world.' 168 Instead, Justice Harlan urged that
constitutional protections should be given to American citizens overseas
according to the circumstances of the case and in light of possible
alternatives. 169
Though Reid is persuasive authority that the Constitution protects
Americans overseas, the extent of the protection has subsequently been
disputed. 170 In 1990, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez171 that non-U.S. citizens living in another country and searched
by the American government are not entitled to the protections of the U.S.
Constitution. 172 In Verdugo- Urquidez, Mexican police arrested a suspected
drug smuggler, extradited him to the United States, and then allowed the
Drug Enforcement Administration to seize documents from the suspect's
home without a warrant. 173 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that the Fourth Amendment applied to the search and, agreeing with
Reid, that the Constitution applies to the U.S. government when it acts
abroad. 174 However, a plurality of the Court refused to follow the lower
courts' interpretation of Reid, stating in dicta that the Reid Court merely
held that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments protected American citizens
abroad. 175 Despite this dicta, the Court in Verdugo-Urquidez limited its
164. Id. at 3-4.
165. Id. at 15.
166. Id. at 4.
167. Id. at 6.
168. Id at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring).
169. Id. at 75.
170. See M. Isabel Medina, Exploring the Use of the Word "Citizen" in Writings on the
Fourth Amendment, 83 IND. L.J. 1557, 1579 (2008) (stating that "it was hardly well-settled
that the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement applied to searches of U.S. citizens' foreign
residences conducted in accordance with foreign law").
171. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
172. See id at 274-75.
173. Id. at 262.
174. Id. at 263.
175. Id. at 270.
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holding to precluding Fourth Amendment protections from applying to
noncitizens when the government acts abroad.176
In his dissent in Verdugo-Urquidez, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.,
stated that nothing in the Court's opinion overturns the rule that the Fourth
Amendment applies to American citizens subjected to searches by the
American government acting abroad. 177 Justice Brennan cited two federal
appellate decisions to support this claim. 17 8 In the first, United States v.
Conroy,179 the U.S. Coast Guard searched an American ship in Haitian
waters. 180 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the
Fourth Amendment protects U.S. citizens outside the country "from
unreasonable searches by [their] own government."'18 1 The second case,
United States v. Rose,1 82 held that an airport search of an American citizen
by Canadian officials in a Canadian airport was not subject to the Fourth
Amendment's exclusionary rule. 183 However, the court stated in dicta that
if the U.S. government participated in the search to the extent that it was a
joint effort, then the Fourth Amendment would apply to the search. 184
Most recently, in United States v. Bin Laden,185 the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York looked at both Reid and Verdugo-
Urquidez and held that an American citizen subjected to a search overseas
could plausibly bring a Fourth Amendment challenge.' 8 6 The defendants in
Bin Laden were charged with various offenses relating to their involvement
in the al Qaeda terrorist organization's bombing of U.S. embassies in Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. 187 Beginning in 1996, American
intelligence monitored telephone calls from al Qaeda affiliates in Kenya
without prior authorization from the Attorney General, including two
phones used by Wadih el-Hage, an American citizen. 188 After authorization
by the Attorney General on April 4, 1997, the FBI targeted el-Hage and,
working with Kenyan authorities, searched el-Hage's home in Nairobi. 189
After his arrest, el-Hage sought to suppress evidence gathered during
176. Id. at 274-75.
177. Id. at 283 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178. Id.
179. 589 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1979).
180. Id. at 1263.
181. Id. at 1264.
182. 570 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978).
183. Id. at 1362.
184. Id; see also United States v. Callaway, 446 F.2d 753, 755 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding
that when a search occurs in a foreign country at the direction of a foreign police force the
Fourth Amendment does not require exclusion of evidence acquired during the search).
185. 126 F. Supp. 2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
186. Id. at 270-71.
187. See id. at 268.
188. See id at 269.
189. See id; Douglas Waller, Inside the Hunt for Osama, TIME, Dec. 21, 1998, at 32, 34.
The government also conducted surveillance of his Texas home, pursuant to a FISA warrant.
In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment Challenges), 552
F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2008).
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searches and surveillance of his Kenyan home. 190 The court held that the
Fourth Amendment applied to el-Hage, an American citizen, after the
government conceded this point of law in its argument. 19 1 However, the
court held that there is a foreign intelligence exception to the Warrant
Clause of the Fourth Amendment, and thus it decided not to exclude the
evidence gathered during the warrantless searches and surveillance.192
2. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa and the
Warrant Requirement Abroad
It took eight years for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to
release a decision in the Bin Laden appeal. 193 Answering the Fourth
Amendment challenges, the court held that only the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness requirement governs extraterritorial searches because the
Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable overseas. 194 The
court acknowledged that "'the Bill of Rights has extraterritorial application
to the conduct abroad of federal agents directed against United States
citizens."' 195 However, the court stated that while the Fourth Amendment
requires "reasonable" searches, there have been many exceptions to the
warrant requirement. 196  The court agreed with the Supreme Court's
rationale in Verdugo-Urquidez that the inability of magistrates to issue
warrants means that the warrant requirement should not apply to searches of
noncitizens overseas and applied the same argument to Americans
overseas. 197
The court's argument listed four reasons for not requiring a warrant for
surveillance of Americans overseas. First, it found no authority stating that
warrants are required for searches abroad by U.S. law enforcement because
none of the other circuits or the Supreme Court had yet ruled on this
particular issue. 198 Second, the court believed that if there should be any
restrictions on the use of search and surveillance by the government abroad,
those restrictions should be imposed by the "political branches through
diplomatic understanding, treaty, or legislation."'199 Third, even if U.S.
judges issued search warrants intended to have extraterritorial effect, they
would probably have no legal significance in the country where they were
190. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 269.
191. Id. at 270-71.
192. See id. at 277, 288; infra note 264 and accompanying text.
193. See In re Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 159.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 167 (quoting United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280 (2d Cir. 1974)).
196. Id. at 168; see also supra note 46.
197. In re Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 169 (citing United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 170 (quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 275) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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used.200 Lastly, the court was not satisfied that judicial officers could be
empowered to issue warrants for overseas searches. 20 1
3. Case for a Warrant Requirement for Searches of Americans Overseas
Despite the Second Circuit's unanimous decision in In re Terrorist
Bombings that the Warrant Clause has no extraterritorial application, there
are countervailing reasons that it should apply. Although no court has yet
stated that there is a warrant requirement for searches of Americans
overseas, this fact alone does not establish that this requirement should not
exist. Novel issues of law always lack precedence in the courts. 20 2 The In
re Terrorist Bombings court found support in the fact that "nothing in our
history or our precedents suggest[s] that U.S. officials must first obtain a
warrant before conducting an overseas search. '20 3  However, the
occurrence or nonoccurrence of this requirement is not alone dispositive of
its validity.2 0 4 "[A]n unconstitutional practice, no matter how inveterate,
cannot be condoned by the judiciary. ' '20 5 Historically, the courts have not
explored certain provisions of the Bill of Rights for years before a question
presented itself.2 0 6 Lack of precedent alone is not enough to foreclose the
adoption of new requirements. 20 7
There is certainly some merit, however, to the separation of powers
argument that the In re Terrorist Bombings court used to justify only
allowing the executive to decide policy decisions that are intertwined with
foreign policy. 20 8 Foreign affairs are an area of executive expertise, and the
Constitution grants the executive power over this area of government.
20 9
200. Id. at 171.
201. Id.
202. See F. Patrick Hubbard, Substantive Due Process Limits on Punitive Damages
Awards: "Morals Without Technique"?, 60 FLA. L. REv. 349, 359-60 (2008) (stating that
constitutional law has often adopted new and unprecedented principles).
203. In re Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 169.
204. See Hubbard, supra note 202, at 359-60.
205. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 616-17 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (stating that though
warrantless surveillance has been historically authorized by Presidents, that fact alone does
not justify an unconstitutional practice). Courts often make entirely novel pronouncements
to protect constitutional rights. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783,
2816 (2008) ("[N]othing in our precedents forecloses our adoption of the original
understanding of the Second Amendment."); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792 (1973) (stating that historical acceptance without more does not
justify finding that a law is constitutional).
206. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816 (noting that it was not until 1931 that the Court found
that a law violated the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech).
207. See id
208. See In re Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 170 n.7; see also infra notes 285-89 and
accompanying text.
209. See Tracey Maclin, The Bush Administration's Terrorist Surveillance Program and
the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Requirement: Lessons from Justice Powell and the Keith
Case, 41 U.C. DAvs L. REv. 1259, 1316 n.257 (2008) (stating that according to United
States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980), separation of powers requires the
acknowledgement that foreign intelligence surveillance is primarily the President's
responsibility); infra note 274 and accompanying text.
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Yet, while the executive makes decisions about the United States' foreign
affairs, all of the powers granted in the Constitution are subject to checks
and balances. 210 Though treaties negotiated by the executive would help
protect the rights of non-Americans overseas, the judiciary has an
obligation to protect American citizens from unreasonable privacy
invasions. 211
A major hindrance to the ability of courts to require a warrant for this
type of surveillance is the lack of a warrant procedure for Americans
overseas. 212 Though the Court in Verdugo-Urquidez stated that any warrant
"would be a dead letter outside the United States," this rationale does not
acknowledge that one of the warrant's most important functions is requiring
judicial review of the search's reasonableness before it is conducted. 213
The warrant is both a "key," allowing law enforcement access to private
spaces, and a "shield," protecting citizens from arbitrary intrusions by their
government. 214 The In re Terrorist Bombings court focused on the "key"-
like aspects of the warrant by claiming that a warrant is not necessary
because it would have no effect in another country. 215 This argument
ignored the important function of warrants as a "shield" that protects
Americans by ensuring that any search is subjected to judicial review prior
to approval. 216  Even if a warrant cannot provide both these functions
abroad, it is still a valuable safeguard of American citizens' rights.217
210. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most
Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1732 (1996) (stating that the idea of separation of
powers can be traced back as far as ancient Greece).
211. See Harry N. Scheiber & Jane L. Scheiber, Bayonets in Paradise: A Half-Century
Retrospect on Martial Law in Hawai'i, 1941-1946, 19 U. HAW. L. REv. 477, 481 (1997)
(writing that the Supreme Court has affirmed that "the judiciary has an obligation to protect
citizens' constitutional rights").
212. United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 276-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating
that although it is theoretically possible for judges to issue warrants for surveillance of
Americans overseas, the lack of a statutory procedure for the acquisition of these warrants
makes it unreasonable to require the government to obtain one), aff'd sub nom. In re
Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment Challenges), 552 F.3d
157 (2d Cir. 2008). Additionally, the Federal Rules do not grant jurisdiction for magistrates
to issue extraterritorial warrants. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. However,
FISA now requires judicial approval before this type of surveillance occurs. See supra note
149 and accompanying text.
213. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274 (1990); id. at 296 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) ("[A] warrant serves the same primary function overseas as it does
domestically: it assures that a neutral magistrate has authorized the search and limited its
scope.").
214. See Pfeiffer, supra note 47, at 234-35 (comparing the warrant to both a "key" and a
"shield").
215. In re Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 171 ("A warrant issued by a U.S. court would
neither empower a U.S. agent to conduct a search nor would it necessarily compel the
intended target to comply.").
216. See Pfeiffer, supra note 47, at 234.
217. Id. at 235.
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B. Foreign Intelligence Exception to the Fourth Amendment's
Warrant Requirement
Courts that have analyzed whether the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement applies to foreign intelligence surveillance have identified a
"foreign intelligence exception" to this requirement. The In re Terrorist
Bombings court refused to follow the foreign intelligence exception
rationale of the pre-FISA circuits. 2 18 The court did not need to address the
question of an exception to the warrant requirement because the court
believed there was no warrant requirement for this type of surveillance. 2 19
However, assuming that there is a warrant requirement for surveillance of
Americans overseas, it is important to also ask whether that warrant
requirement would be subject to a foreign intelligence exception. Part II.B
asks whether there is a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment and what implications this exception
would have on warrantless foreign surveillance targeting U.S. persons
abroad.
1. The "Foreign Intelligence Exception" in the Circuits
When the Supreme Court decided the Keith case in 1972, it limited its
holding to domestic security surveillance and did not decide whether a
warrant would be required for foreign intelligence surveillance of U.S.
persons.2 20 Before 1978, when FISA established a warrant procedure for
this type of surveillance, five circuit courts of appeals answered the
question.22 1 Four of these circuits held that there is a foreign intelligence
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 22 2
However, a plurality of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
stated, in extensive dicta, that there should not be such an exception. 223 All
of these courts were examining the problem as it related to the surveillance
of American citizens generally. This Note analyzes the rationale of these
courts to decide whether a warrant should be required before the United
States conducts foreign intelligence surveillance of Americans overseas.
a. Fifth Circuit
In United States v. Brown,224 the Fifth Circuit held that the President may
authorize warrantless wiretaps for foreign intelligence purposes. 225 The
petitioner, H. Rap Brown, appealed his conviction for transporting a firearm
218. In re Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 172.
219. Id. at 171-72.
220. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 321-22 (1972). See supra
note 111 and accompanying text.
221. See infra notes 224-58 and accompanying text.
222. See infra notes 224-50 and accompanying text.
223. See infra notes 251-57 and accompanying text.
224. 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973).
225. Id. at 426.
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while under indictment. 226  Brown challenged the legality of three
warrantless wiretaps authorized by the Attorney General. 227 Though Brown
appeared on these undisclosed foreign intelligence wiretaps, according to
the court they had no relevance to his case and were conducted pursuant to
executive authority. 228 The Fifth Circuit held that the executive has power
"over and above the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment" to conduct
warrantless electronic surveillance to protect against foreign threats to
national security. 229
b. Third Circuit
In United States v. Butenko,230 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that, though the Fourth Amendment applies to a President
acting pursuant to his foreign affairs powers, the foreign intelligence
exception removes the need to secure a search warrant before conducting
surveillance of agents of a foreign power.231 The petitioners, a Soviet
national and an American citizen, appealed their conviction for transmitting
highly sensitive information about the United States' Strategic Air
Command to the Soviet Union.232 Because the government did not obtain a
search warrant prior to conducting its surveillance, the surveillance had to
fall within an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment to be admissible as evidence. 233  Though the court
acknowledged that there are benefits to requiring prior judicial approval for
this type of surveillance, on the balance the court believed that to maintain a
"continuous flow of information" the court should defer to the "good faith
of the executive" in foreign intelligence matters.234 Therefore, the court
held that the surveillance did not violate the petitioners' Fourth Amendment
rights because it fit within a foreign intelligence warrant exception. 235
c. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Buck,236 held that "[f]oreign
security wiretaps are a recognized exception to the general warrant
requirement. '237 The petitioner, Marilyn Buck, appealed her conviction for
furnishing false information in the acquisition of ammunition. 238 Buck was
226. Id. at 420-21.
227. Id. at 425.
228. Id. at 426-27.
229. Id. at 426.
230. 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974).
231. Id. at 606.
232. Id. at 596.
233. Id. at 604.
234. Id. at 605.
235. Id. at 606.
236. 548 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1977).
237. Id. at 875.
238. Id. at 873.
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a gunrunner for the Black Liberation Army (BLA),239 an American "leftist
terrorist organization[]. ' ' 240 Though the BLA was apparently a domestic
organization, some of the evidence used to prosecute Buck came from
undisclosed foreign intelligence surveillance. 24 1 The trial court decided not
to disclose the test it used to determine the legality of one of the
government's wiretaps because the wiretap was executive-authorized
foreign intelligence surveillance. 242 Buck appealed this decision. 243 The
trial court and circuit court agreed that a wiretap approved by the Attorney
General and used for foreign intelligence gathering was lawful because of a
foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement. 244
d. Fourth Circuit
In United States v. Truong Dinh Hung,245 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit held that the foreign intelligence needs of the executive
are so compelling that a warrant requirement would "unduly frustrate" the
President's ability to carry out his foreign affairs powers. 246 In Truong, a
Vietnamese man living in the United States surreptitiously smuggled
classified documents and diplomatic cables to representatives of the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 247  American intelligence monitored
Truong's telephone continuously for 268 days without court authorization
before arresting Truong and charging him with espionage and conspiracy to
commit espionage.248 On appeal, Truong challenged his conviction for
these charges because he claimed that the government violated the Fourth
Amendment by not acquiring prior court authorization to conduct the
surveillance. 249 The government and the court agreed that a warrant was
unnecessary since the surveillance fit within a foreign intelligence
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 250
e. D.C. Circuit
In Zweibon v. Mitchell,25 1 a plurality of the D.C. Circuit held that, absent
exigent circumstances, all warrantless surveillance of domestic
239. See Woman Is JailedAs a Gunrunner, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1973, at 18.
240. Sean Wilentz, Bombs Bursting in Air, Still, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1995, (Magazine),
at 40.
241. See Buck, 548 F.2d at 875.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
246. Id. at 913.
247. Id. at 911-12.
248. Id. at 912.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 912-13.
251. 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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organizations that are not agents of a foreign power is unreasonable and
unconstitutional, even if conducted under presidential directive in the name
of foreign intelligence gathering. 252  The appellants in Zweibon were
sixteen members of the Jewish Defense League (JDL) who sued Attorney
General John Mitchell and nine FBI agents for electronic surveillance of
their telephone calls in violation of Title III and the Fourth Amendment. 253
The Attorney General authorized the wiretaps to monitor JDL activities
considered antagonistic toward the Soviet Union. 254 The government again
claimed that there was a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but the D.C. Circuit disagreed with
the other circuits that had analyzed this same question.255 The court found
that the other circuits had not adequately balanced the competing interests
of national security and privacy rights.256 After a long analysis, the court
stated that the warrant procedure would not hinder legitimate intelligence
surveillance and opined that "absent exigent circumstances, no wiretapping
in the area of foreign affairs should be exempt from prior judicial
scrutiny." 257 However, as the court was not required to make such a broad
holding, it instead limited its holding to requiring a warrant for surveillance
of domestic organizations that attack foreign powers rather than
organizations acting in concert with a foreign power or its agents.2
58
2. Post-FISA Foreign Intelligence Exception for U.S. Persons Abroad in
United States v. Bin Laden
After FISA created a warrant procedure for foreign intelligence
surveillance that could affect U.S. persons, the foreign intelligence
exception argument seemed settled.259 However, FISA originally only
applied to surveillance conducted on U.S. persons residing in the United
States and provided no guidance for the review of surveillance conducted
on U.S. persons abroad. 260 Because of this gap in FISA, the Bin Laden
court had to employ a common law analysis to determine whether there was
a foreign intelligence warrant exception for surveillance of Americans
overseas.261 No court had previously considered the applicability of the
foreign intelligence exception to this type of surveillance. 262
252. Id. at 614.
253. Id. at 605-06.
254. Id. at 608-09. These activities included peaceful demonstrations as well as violent
attacks such as the bombing of the Amtorg and Intourist-Aeroflot offices in New York City.
Id. at 608.
255. See id at 613-14; supra notes 224-50.
256. See Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 628-59.
257. Id. at 651.
258. Id
259. See supra notes 119-42 and accompanying text.
260. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(0(2) (2006).
261. See United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 274-88 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd
sub nom. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment
Challenges), 552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008).
262. Id. at 272.
[Vol. 78
THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE
The Bin Laden court agreed with Keith that there is no warrant exception
for domestic security surveillance 263 but held there is a clear foreign
intelligence exception for surveillance of foreign powers and their
agents. 264 For surveillance of U.S. citizens living abroad, the court held
that, while a warrant is irrefutably a better safeguard for Fourth Amendment
rights than a process without judicial approval, a warrant requirement
would impose an undue burden on the executive branch. 265 The court
stated that the drawbacks of a warrant requirement included decreased
response time to critical events, possible security breaches, and the need to
cooperate with foreign intelligence agencies to secure a local warrant. 266
For all these reasons, the court held that there is an exception to the
warrant requirement for foreign intelligence surveillance when there is
authorization by the President or Attorney General. 267 The court also
reaffirmed that the reasonableness of a warrantless search may be
challenged in court after the fact.268 However, unlike Keith, the Bin Laden
court did not weigh personal privacy rights against national security needs
while conducting its analysis.269
3. Foreign Intelligence Exception to the Warrant Requirement for
Surveillance of U.S. Persons Overseas
Since the Bin Laden decision, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008
extended FISA protections to Americans overseas. 270 However, these
amendments have also rolled back some of the judicial review procedures
263. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 321-22 (1972).
264. See Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 277; see also United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871,
875 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Foreign security wiretaps are a recognized exception to the general
warrant requirement .... "); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir. 1974)(holding that a court should not interfere with the efficient operation of the executive's
foreign policy apparatus); United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165, 171 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding
that there is a presidential prerogative to obtain foreign intelligence information preserved in
§ 605 of Title III).
265. See Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 273-74.
266. See id at 275. However, the court seemed to be skeptical that a local warrant was
absolutely necessary and relied on cases that suggested courts had general Iurisdiction to
issue warrants in conformity with the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 276-77 n.16; see also
United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 168 n.14, 169 (1977) (holding that warrants do
not have to relate to tangible things and a warrant can be issued for a pen register); United
States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 678 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that the district court has the
inherent power to issue warrants authorizing silent video surveillance); United States v.
Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 878-79 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that the power to issue a warrant was
historically an inherent power of a court of general jurisdiction). But see Weinberg v. United
States, 126 F.2d 1004, 1006 (2d Cir. 1942) (holding that U.S. district judges possess no
extraterritorial jurisdiction); Then, supra note 47, at 1073-74 (stating that Congress and the
Supreme Court have had opportunities to explicitly extend the jurisdiction of federal judges).
267. See Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 277.
268. See id.
269. See id. at 273 (stating that a warrant better safeguards the Fourth Amendment rights
of citizens but should not be required when it presents a disabling burden on the executive).
270. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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found in the original FISA.27 t Thus, there is still some dispute whether a
more comprehensive judicial warrant review procedure is necessary prior to
surveillance of Americans overseas. 272 This Note considers the merits of a
warrant application process similar to the original FISA.
In Zweibon v. Mitchell, the D.C. Circuit looked at five possible factors
that would justify forgoing prior judicial approval of foreign intelligence
surveillance: judicial competence in foreign affairs, security leaks,
evidentiary use of foreign intelligence information, possible delays in
warrant approval, and the administrative burden on the courts. 273 This
section examines the arguments surrounding whether there should be a
warrant exception for foreign intelligence surveillance in light of these
factors as well as the President's constitutional authority to conduct foreign
affairs.
a. The President's Constitutional Authority To Conduct Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance
Most of the circuit courts that have held that there is a foreign
intelligence exception have based their decisions, at least in part, on the
President's expertise in foreign affairs. 2 74  The executive branch
unquestionably has greater expertise in foreign intelligence matters than the
judiciary. 2 75 In United States v. Curtiss- Wright,276 the Court stated that the
President's authority in foreign affairs is paramount and "[the President],
not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which
prevail in foreign countries."277  However, although the Constitution
implies that the President has the authority to conduct foreign intelligence
surveillance to protect national security, nowhere does the Constitution
suggest that the Fourth Amendment does not apply in the area of foreign
affairs.27 8  Even in conducting constitutionally granted foreign affairs
271. See supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
272. The FISA Amendments Act's removal of many of FISA's original judicial review
features renews the foreign intelligence exception debate. However, this Note is limited to
exploring whether warrants should be required for surveillance of Americans overseas.
273. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
274. See, e.g., United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 914 (4th Cir. 1980)
(stating that the executive branch is constitutionally designated as the government authority
on foreign affairs); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 601 (3d Cir. 1974) (stating that
the Constitution empowers the President to conduct foreign affairs); United States v. Brown,
484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973) (relying for their holding on the President's inherent
power in conducting foreign affairs).
275. See Truong, 629 F.2d at 914; Justin M. Sandberg, Comment, The Need for Warrants
Authorizing Foreign Intelligence Searches of American Citizens Abroad: A Call for
Formalism, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 403, 405 (2002) (stating that because of the executive's
expertise in foreign affairs matters, the courts have shown deference to foreign intelligence
surveillance).
276. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
277. Id. at 320.
278. See Butenko, 494 F.2d at 603; Maclin, supra note 209, at 1306 ("The Supreme Court
has never held that the President is free to ignore the Bill of Rights whenever Executive
Branch functions concern foreign affairs.").
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powers, the President is still "constrained by other provisions in the
Constitution." 279  Thus, even when the executive believes that certain
activities implicate national security, it still must adhere to the requirements
of the Fourth Amendment. 280
Though cases have often relied on Curtiss-Wright to show the President's
ability to conduct foreign affairs, the Court in Curtiss-Wright still warned
that "like every other governmental power, [the President's plenary power
over foreign relations] must be exercised in subordination to the applicable
provisions of the Constitution."'281  Thus, the unquestioned executive
prerogative for gathering foreign affairs intelligence that some courts have
found when holding that there is a foreign intelligence exception is not
actually written into the text of the Constitution.282 In Truong, the Fourth
Circuit held that the foreign intelligence needs of the executive are so
compelling that a warrant requirement would unduly frustrate the
President's ability to carry out his foreign affairs. 283 However, the Truong
court overlooked the fact that the President's foreign affairs decisions are
subject to the same checks and balances as all other powers of the federal
government. 284 The Truong court also reasoned that under the separation of
powers doctrine, the executive has been entrusted with the safety of the
country and foreign intelligence surveillance. 285 The Butenko court stated
that foreign intelligence needs often cannot be anticipated and, if courts
required a warrant to carry out foreign intelligence, the President might
have to act illegally in order to fulfill the constitutional duties of the
office.286 While this is a valid concern, Congress has previously regulated
279. United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that
the Supreme Court has held that the executive using its foreign affairs powers is still
constrained by other parts of the Constitution), aff'd sub nom. In re Terrorist Bombings of
U.S. Embassies in E. Aft. (Fourth Amendment Challenges), 552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008); see
also Maclin, supra note 209, at 1306.
280. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 308 (1972).
281. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320; see also Britta A. Schnoor, Note, International
Law, the Power of the Purse, and Speaking with One Voice: The Legal Cacophony Created
By Withholding U.S. Dues from the United Nations, 92 IOWA L. REv. 1133, 1175 n.250
(2007) (stating that Congress has some role in foreign affairs).
282. See Butenko, 494 F.2d at 628 (Gibbons, J., dissenting in part) ("The majority's
awesome executive prerogative for gathering foreign affairs intelligence cannot be found in
the text of the Constitution."); Jeffrey C. Goldman, Note, Of Treaties and Torture: How the
Supreme Court Can Restrain the Executive, 55 DUKE L.J. 609, 633 (2005) (stating that even
though the Constitution grants the President primary authority over foreign affairs, the
President is "not the 'sole organ' of foreign affairs" with unchecked power).
283. United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980).
284. See Butenko, 494 F.2d at 634 (Gibbons, J., dissenting in part) ("No reason suggests
itself to me why the fourth amendment should be considered as applicable to the foreign
affairs or external powers of the central government in any lesser or different manner than to
all its other powers."); see also Kitrosser, supra note 118, at 1183-84 (stating that in the
years prior to the Church Committee Report, the government failed to provide adequate
checks and balances on intelligence operations).
285. See Truong, 629 F.2d at 914 (citing United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407
U.S. 297, 316-18 (1972)).
286. Butenko, 494 F.2d at 605.
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the activities of foreign intelligence agents.287 Checks and balances help
combat the human tendency to abuse power.288 It does not appear that the
Framers wanted to suspend checks and balances when they affect the
President's foreign affairs power.289
The Bin Laden court reasoned that there is great precedent for a foreign
intelligence exception to the warrant requirement because Presidents have
conducted warrantless foreign intelligence collection for much of the
twentieth century. 290 However, precedent alone does not eschew the need
for a constitutional inquiry into the legality of warrantless foreign
intelligence surveillance. 291  After all, it was not until 1967 that the
Supreme Court decided that nontrespassory electronic surveillance violated
the Fourth Amendment. 292 The presidential memos addressing electronic
surveillance authorized "wiretapping," a nontrespassory surveillance that
was still constitutionally allowed under Olmstead without a warrant.293 The
Zweibon court did not believe this presidential authorization justified a
constitutional exception because the judgments were not based on current
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 294 Further, since 1978, FISA has made
warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance illegal when at least one party
is in the United States.295
287. The National Security Act of 1947 and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
both placed limits on foreign intelligence activities. Id. at 629 (Gibbons, J., dissenting in
part).
288. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison); see also Kitrosser, supra note 118, at
1184 (observing that the definition of "national security" is often stretched to justify
government operations).
289. Butenko, 494 F.2d at 634 (Gibbons, J., dissenting in part). The Butenko dissent
includes a textual exegesis of foreign affairs power in the Colonial era, the Articles of
Confederation, and the U.S. Constitution. In particular, since all federal government powers
under the Articles of Confederation were vested in the legislature, Judge John Gibbons stated
it was apparent that any of these powers then transferred to the executive branch under the
Constitution would be subjected to checks and balances that formed the core of the
compromise of 1787. See id.; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assault on the Constitution:
Executive Power and the War on Terrorism, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1, 7 (2006) ("[N]o
Supreme Court case in American history has ever approved presidential actions that violate
the Constitution, statutes, or treaties based on inherent executive powers.").
290. United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that
executive-authorized foreign intelligence collection has been practiced for decades), affd
sub nom. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment
Challenges), 552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008).
291. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 616-17 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (stating that the
Supreme Court has never approved this warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance).
292. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) ("[T]he reach of [the Fourth]
Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
enclosure.").
293. See Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 617-18 (describing the executive's interpretation of § 605
of the Federal Communications Act).
294. Id. at 619-20.
295. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(0(2) (2006); supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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b. Judicial Competence To Analyze Foreign Intelligence Matters
Some courts have questioned whether courts are capable of approving
foreign intelligence surveillance warrants. 296 The Bin Laden court, for
instance, stated that the judiciary is ill suited to oversee foreign intelligence
collection. 297 The executive has more expertise in foreign intelligence,
diplomacy, and military affairs than the judiciary. 298 However, there is
evidence that Congress believes the judiciary is capable of making these
determinations because, by creating FISA, they sanctioned a successful
process for judicial review of foreign intelligence warrants. 299 Congress
has also recently entrusted the FISC to do the same with surveillance of
Americans overseas, though with a more limited judicial review.300
It is true, in general, that the judiciary is less knowledgeable about
foreign diplomacy matters than the executive because judges do not
adjudicate foreign affairs matters frequently. 30 1  The Bin Laden court
believed it would be difficult for judges to understand all the foreign policy
implications of their decision in a judicial review of a warrant request. 30 2 It
is important to note, however, that the President and Attorney General do
not individually analyze each scenario that requires foreign intelligence
surveillance. 30 3 Executive approval of foreign intelligence surveillance
relies on the recommendations and analysis of many lower-level employees
in the Justice Department and intelligence agencies. 30 4 Any information the
Attorney General receives from experts in foreign intelligence could also be
provided to judges to secretly review. 30 5 After all, the President chooses an
Attorney General for her skills as a lawyer.30 6 A federal judge should not
296. See, e.g., In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment
Challenges), 552 F.3d 157, 171 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[I]t is by no means clear that U.S. judicial
officers could be authorized to issue warrants for overseas searches .... "); United States v.
Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that Keith and FISA have
weakened this argument but it is still valid with respect to overseas warrants), affd sub nom.
In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment Challenges), 552
F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008).
297. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 274; see also Sandberg, supra note 275, at 415-16
(stating that courts are ill-suited to foreign policy questions because they cannot identify
foreign relations interests).
298. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
301. See Note, Foreign Security Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 976, 983 (1974) (stating that the adjudication of foreign affairs matters increases the
likelihood of judicial error).
302. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 274 (stating that foreign policy decisions often have a
significant impact on foreign relations).
303. See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (describing the process
of executive authorization of foreign intelligence surveillance).
304. See id.
305. Id. at 644 (stating that judges can be briefed in camera in the same manner as the
Attorney General is briefed on the necessity of foreign intelligence surveillance).
306. Id. (stating that the Attorney General is chosen based on legal skills rather than
diplomatic skills).
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be any less competent than a skilled lawyer in evaluating surveillance
requests. 307
The executive has directed foreign policy throughout U.S. history.30 8 It
was because of the particular difficulties of overseas foreign intelligence
collection and the sensitive nature of relations between nations that Keith
limited its holding to domestic cases. 30 9  Often foreign intelligence
decisions have a significant impact on the relationship between the United
States and foreign governments.310 However, the executive could also
persuade a court to allow certain surveillance without jeopardizing this
sensitive relationship. 311 The judiciary seems competent enough to weigh
several complicated factors because "[c]ourts regularly deal with the most
difficult issues of our society. 312
c. Secrecy
Because of the secrecy of many foreign affairs matters, some
commentators and courts believe it is improper for parties outside the
executive to view many classified documents.313 Some leaks of secret
information could pose a threat to national security and the lives of agents
and confidential sources. 314 However, there are countervailing reasons to
believe the courts are equally capable of handling sensitive foreign affairs
information. First, there is no reason to believe that the executive is less
307. See id. (stating that it is unlikely that a judge would incorrectly deny a legitimate
request for a surveillance warrant).
308. See supra notes 274-77 and accompanying text.
309. United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that
Keith and FISA did not address overseas foreign intelligence collection), aff'd sub nom. In re
Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment Challenges), 552 F.3d
157 (2d Cir. 2008).
310. See id.
311. See Sandberg, supra note 275, at 419 (stating that the executive can convince the
judiciary that surveillance is necessary but by deferring to the executive in foreign affairs
matters the judiciary would be avoiding their responsibility to uphold the Fourth
Amendment).
312. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972) (refuting the
government's argument that internal security matters are too complex for judicial
competence).
313. See United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973); Then, supra note 47,
at 1076 (stating that allowing judicial scrutiny of overseas foreign surveillance could
increase the risk of security breaches). Justice Robert Jackson wrote in Chicago & Southern
Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp. that "[t]he President ... has available intelligence
services whose reports are not and ought not to be published to the world. It would be
intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify
actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret." 333 U.S. 103, 111
(1948).
314. See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Edward L. Xanders,
Note, A Handyman's Guide To Fixing National Security Leaks: An Analytical Framework
for Evaluating Proposals To Curb Unauthorized Publication of Classified Information, 5
J.L. & POL. 759, 779-80 (1989) (noting that reducing national security leaks would minimize
harm to security policy).
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susceptible to leaks than the judiciary. 315 Government secrets are always
capable of leaking, no matter which branch of government holds them.316
Second, leaks from the judiciary are less likely because FISA has solved
many of the executive's concerns about security leaks with its strict secrecy
requirements. 317
While involving the judiciary in foreign intelligence approval may not
necessarily lead to an increase in security leaks, the Bin Laden court
suggested that the perception that leaks are more likely may discourage
intelligence agencies from acting with the required prior judicial
approval. 318 There is at least the potential for an intelligence agent to
decide that some information is too risky to disseminate within the
government, and decide to forego potentially beneficial surveillance or to
conduct the surveillance without review. While this will remain a risk,
there are tangential benefits to be reaped from fostering a government
environment in which some reasonable disclosure of secrets is encouraged.
The Church Committee's report found that the intelligence agencies
themselves often kept secrets from the executive and Congress. 319 Of
course, sensitive government and foreign affairs secrets should not be made
public. 320 However, secrets are less valuable if they are held entirely within
one part of government rather than shared with other departments that
might benefit from the information.321
Former Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez argued that even allowing
terrorists to know that there is a procedure for procuring foreign intelligence
warrants would hurt the government's ability to gather intelligence because
terrorists would be more careful with their communications if they knew the
United States could be listening and would be aware of a necessary delay in
315. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 320-21 (stating that the judiciary has long been entrusted with
sensitive information in criminal matters); see also Sandberg, supra note 275, at 408-09 n.37
(noting that Keith dismissed the notion that allowing the judiciary to review intelligence
matters would increase leaks).
316. See Rubenfeld, supra note 138, at 160 ("State secrets have a way of leaking out.").
The NSA's warrantless domestic surveillance program first came to light in 2005 because of
a leak by a top official in the Justice Department. See Michael Isikoff, The Fed Who Blew
the Whistle, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 22, 2008, at 42.
317. Heidi Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities: Improving
Information Funnels, 29 CARDozo L. REV. 1049, 1052 (2008) ("Warrant applications must
be made to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under provisions that facilitate much
secrecy.").
318. United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd sub
nom. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment
Challenges), 552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008).
319. See Kitrosser, supra note 118, at 1184.
320. See Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for
Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REv. 909, 933 (2006) ("Effective executive power and
the president's success as commander-in-chief sometimes depend on discretion to withhold
information from general circulation.").
321. See 9/11 REPORT, supra note 32, at 353 (finding that secrecy and lack of
communication between government agencies was one reason why the United States'
intelligence agencies failed to stop the 9/11 attacks).
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responding to threats. 322 It seems unlikely, however, that it would be
dangerous for terrorists and enemies to merely know that there is a
procedure for authorizing spying. 323 In the case of immediate threats,
exigency is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.324  If
terrorists knew of a review procedure for foreign intelligence surveillance
of Americans overseas they would certainly also know of the exigent
circumstances exception. A foreign intelligence warrant requirement would
not necessarily result in a strategic disadvantage for the United States.
d. Nonevidentiary Use of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
The Truong court stated that because most foreign intelligence is
conducted for internal use and not to be used in a criminal case, a warrant is
not necessary.325 The executive has argued that the reasons for invasions of
privacy in foreign affairs cases are different than in criminal cases because
the surveillance is not conducted to obtain evidence to be used in a trial and
thus a warrant requirement would be impracticable. 326 However, foreign
intelligence has been admitted as evidence in criminal cases. 327 All of the
cases recognizing a foreign intelligence exception were criminal cases. 328
322. Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency's Surveillance
Authority: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 11 (2006), available
at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_hr/nsasurv.html.
323. See Kitrosser, supra note 118, at 1200-01 ("[lIt is difficult to imagine why
knowledge of the precise legal framework for conducting covert surveillance would
advantage terrorists who already know that they can be spied on covertly.").
324. See supra note 46 and accompanying text; Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509
(1978) ("Our decisions have recognized that a warrantless entry by criminal law enforcement
officials may be legal when there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure
a warrant."); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) ("The
Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation
if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.").
325. United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915 (4th Cir. 1980) (stating that
if the surveillance is done primarily for foreign intelligence purposes then the government
should not have to get a warrant). The Justice Department used a similar rationale in
interpreting the effect of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 on government
warrantless security surveillance. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
326. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 635 (3d Cir. 1974) (Gibbons, J., dissenting
in part).
327. See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("[G]iven the fact that
judicial review of Executive-ordered surveillance would be proper in any event after it
occurs, the judicial competence argument has no substantial merit as a rationale for
abrogating the warrant procedure.").
328. See, e.g., Truong, 629 F.2d 908 (affirming a conviction for espionage and conspiracy
to commit espionage); United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1977) (affirming a
conviction for furnishing false information in connection with the acquisition of
ammunition); Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (affirming a conviction for conspiring to transmit to
foreign government information relating to the United States' national defense); United
States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973) (affirming conviction for interstate
transportation of a firearm while under indictment); United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp.
2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (convicting multiple defendants of assorted crimes associated with
the bombing of U.S. embassies in East Africa), aff'd sub nom. In re Terrorist Bombings of
U.S. Embassies in E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment Challenges), 552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008).
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Even if foreign intelligence surveillance -is not admitted in a criminal trial,
Fourth Amendment privacy concerns do not diminish.329 The Fourth
Amendment "reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not. '330
Historically, courts have only required warrants in criminal investigations
and not to permit ongoing foreign intelligence surveillance. 331 However,
the warrant requirement serves an important function by reassuring citizens
that illegal surveillance is not tolerated.332
e. Delay
The Truong court stated that foreign intelligence needs are different from
domestic security surveillance needs because responses to foreign threats
require great speed. 333  Often foreign intelligence needs cannot be
anticipated, and the response to these intelligence needs must be fast and
efficient. 334 The Bin Laden court stated that when a warrant presents a
disabling burden, it should not be required. 335 A warrant requirement,
however, is not necessarily a disabling burden. 336 The risk of delay has
historically been solved by the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement. 337 FISA incorporated two emergency exceptions to
accommodate particularly hasty surveillance needs.338  Warrantless
electronic surveillance may be justified in exigent circumstances such as the
imminent threat of harm to national security.339 Courts would only hold
that surveillance conducted under this exception is illegal if a warrant
would not have been issued had the intelligence agency submitted to prior
judicial review and there were found to be no exigent circumstances. 340
329. Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 649 (stating that Fourth Amendment privacy interests are not
decreased because there is no criminal prosecution).
330. Id. at 649 n.173 (quoting Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 255 (1960) (Brennan,
J., dissenting)).
331. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 318-19 (1972) (describing
one of the government's arguments for recognizing an exception to the warrant requirement
for domestic security surveillance).
332. Id. at 321 (stating that one of the most important functions of a warrant is "the
reassurance of the public generally that indiscriminate wiretapping and bugging of law-
abiding citizens cannot occur"); see also supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
333. Truong, 629 F.2d at 913,
334. See id. at 915 (stating that foreign intelligence collection requires great "speed,
stealth, and secrecy").
335. United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd sub
nom. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Aft. (Fourth Amendment
Challenges), 552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008).
336. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
337. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
339. See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 649-50 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (stating that the
threat of imminent harm to national security or loss of important intelligence information is
often used to justify forgoing a warrant requirement for foreign intelligence surveillance);
see also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
340. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 637 (3d Cir. 1974) (Gibbons, J., dissenting
in part) ("The only instance where executive action could not be approved by the courts
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f. Administrative Burden
A practical problem with requiring a warrant for foreign intelligence
surveillance of Americans overseas is there is currently no statutory
procedure for approving specific warrants for this type of surveillance. 341
Title III has no extraterritorial effect 342 and FISA no longer requires
individualized warrant review for surveillance of Americans overseas. 343
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not grant judges the power to
approve warrants in another country because under Rule 41(b) magistrates
are not empowered to issue international warrants. 344
The In re Terrorist Bombings court cited the courts' inability to issue
warrants with extraterritorial effect as a major reason why the Warrant
Clause does not apply overseas. 345 However, Justice Brennan said in his
dissent in Verdugo-Urquidez that "Congress cannot excise the [Warrant]
Clause from the Constitution" simply by not creating procedures that allow
foreign intelligence agents to obtain warrants. 346 The fact that there is not
currently a procedure for individually reviewing warrant requests for
Americans overseas is not alone dispositive as to whether there should be a
specific warrant requirement. 347
Requiring a warrant for all foreign surveillance of Americans overseas
would be more burdensome than the current system. However, Justice
Lewis Powell stated in Keith, regarding domestic security cases, that
"[a]lthough some added burden will be imposed upon the Attorney General,
this inconvenience is justified in a free society to protect constitutional
values." 348 Similarly, Justice John Marshall once said, "[q]uestions may
occur, which [courts] would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All
we can do is, to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform
our duty. ' '3
49
would be where there were no exigent circumstances or where no court could legally have
issued a warrant.").
341. See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
342. See United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that Title III
has no extraterritorial effect).
343. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 188 1a(g) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009).
344. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b).
345. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr. (Fourth Amendment
Challenges), 552 F.3d 157, 171 (2d Cir. 2008).
346. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 295 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
347. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("Instead of following the
proper analysis of determining whether a warrant proceeding would frustrate the legitimate
need of the Executive to acquire foreign intelligence information, these courts treated the
need itself as determinative of the legality of warrantless surveillance.").
348. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972); see also
Sandberg, supra note 275, at 408-09 (stating that Keith formulated a balancing test that
determined whether the burden of a warrant requirement was justified by the warrant's
protection of constitutional values).
349. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821) (stating that the judiciary must take a
case if it is within the court's jurisdiction); see also Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in
a Government of by, and for the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30
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In practice, requiring a warrant when the United States conducts foreign
intelligence surveillance of U.S. persons overseas should not be a
significant added burden.350 There is little to suggest that the process
would be fundamentally different than granting a warrant in the domestic
intelligence context.351  First, this burden would only occur when the
government knew the target was a "United States person."352  Second,
American courts have the authority to issue warrants for foreign searches
that satisfy the Fourth Amendment. 353 Several cases have held that the
courts have the power to issue warrants even for subjects not covered by
any statute. 354 Even if a warrant created in the United States has no force in
a foreign jurisdiction, the process of acquiring a warrant protects Americans
from arbitrary invasions of privacy by the government.355 Finally, FISA
now covers surveillance of Americans overseas, nullifying the criticism that
U.S. judges cannot approve this type of surveillance. 356
III. A STATUTORY WARRANT REQUIREMENT FOR SEARCHES AND
SURVEILLANCE OF AMERICANS OVERSEAS
Having weighed the arguments, Part III suggests that a warrant
requirement for foreign intelligence surveillance conducted on Americans
overseas exists and should be enforced. Part III.A explains why a warrant
requirement for this type of surveillance would be beneficial. Part III.B
describes FISA procedures that would make this warrant approval
procedure safe and effective.
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 82 (2008) ("While the judiciary may invalidate laws that are
unconstitutional, judges may not ignore laws that they find unwise or inconvenient.").
350. See Craig S. Lemer, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951,
971 n.108 (2003) (stating that "probable cause" for a FISA warrant is a much lower standard
than in the criminal context).
351. See Carrie Truehart, Comment, United States v. Bin Laden and the Foreign
Intelligence Exception to the Warrant Requirement for Searches of "United States Persons"
Abroad, 82 B.U. L. REV. 555, 591 (2002) (stating that FISA already has a process for
approving foreign intelligence surveillance and the Bin Laden court wrongly assumed that a
court would have to contact the country where they issue the warrant).
352. See id. at 590 (stating that foreign intelligence searches of Americans presumably
occur far less often than searches of non-Americans).
353. United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 277 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd
sub nom. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Aft. (Fourth Amendment
Challenges), 552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008).
354. See, e.g., United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 168 n.14 (1977) (recognizing
an inherent judicial power to issue warrants conforming to the Fourth Amendment); United
States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 678 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that a court of general jurisdiction
has the right to issue warrants conforming to the Fourth Amendment); see also Thomas M.
Messana, Note, Ricks v. State: Big Brother Has Arrived in Maryland, 48 MD. L. REV. 435,
446-47 (1989) (stating that United States v. New York Telephone Co. was based on a broad
reading of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).
355. Pfeiffer, supra note 47, at 234.
356. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(b)(3) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009).
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A. Reasons To Require a Warrant for Searches and Surveillance of
Americans Overseas
1. Americans Often Travel and Live Overseas
There should be a warrant requirement for searches and surveillance
conducted by the U.S. government against American citizens overseas. Six
million Americans live outside the United States. 357 Many U.S. citizens
who live outside the country require privacy for their work. 358 A plurality
of the Supreme Court has interpreted the U.S. Constitution as providing
protection to American citizens wherever they may be. 359 Just as travelers
should not be required to relinquish their passports when they leave the
country, they should also not lose important constitutional protections just
because they are no longer on American soil.
2. Warrants Protect Against Arbitrary Government Intrusions
One reason why the Middle Eastern satellite phone surveillance is such
an egregious violation of privacy rights is that some of the surveillance
seems to provide little benefit to intelligence agencies. 360 Instituting a
warrant procedure would offer an opportunity for intelligence agencies or
the executive to explain exactly why proposed surveillance is necessary and
beneficial. Allowing the executive to decide whether to conduct
surveillance does not effectively protect the rights of Americans. 361 As
Justice Douglas wrote in his Katz concurrence, the government cannot
adequately protect Fourth Amendment rights when it assumes the role of
both prosecutor and judge.362 Since most intelligence officers would not
attempt to justify unnecessary intelligence, requiring that officers explain
surveillance would help eliminate the least important surveillance before it
is submitted to a judge. However, when no justification is required, there is
a temptation to err on the side of overinclusiveness, even if the surveillance
is unnecessary. 363
There is a risk that some agents will not submit to judicial review out of
fear of a warrant-request denial for seemingly necessary surveillance. 364
This fear is unfounded, however, as there is every indication that judges
would be deferential to the field experience of intelligence workers and the
357. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
359. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
360. See supra Introduction.
361. See supra notes 115-16 (discussing when the executive, with no oversight over its
surveillance activities, had used surveillance for impermissible purposes).
362. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
363. See supra Introduction. The Highlander program's surveillance of humanitarian
organizations does not seem to have been particularly important surveillance. See supra note
14 and accompanying text.
364. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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foreign affairs expertise of the executive. 365  There is also an
overwhelmingly high approval rate for FISA warrant applications. 366
Despite this deference, judicial scrutiny is essential because it gives an
impartial party an opportunity to weigh the intrusion of privacy against the
benefit to be gained from the intrusion. 367 The ideal warrant procedure
would protect constitutional rights while helping law enforcement and
intelligence agents protect the country.368
3. Specific Warrants Better Protect Americans from Privacy Intrusions
Many of the benefits of warrants are lost when the FISC gives
generalized approval for surveillance. 369 Specific warrants conform better
to the Fourth Amendment, which states that warrants should "particularly
describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. '370 Specifically stating the subject and place of surveillance
decreases the amount of law enforcement discretion in carrying out
searches. 371  For this reason FISA, as currently amended, does not
adequately protect the rights of Americans living abroad. 372
As originally drafted, FISA represented Congress's best answer to the
abuse of surveillance privileges by the executive branch and intelligence
agencies. 373 This response incorporated many safeguards to protect the
sensitive information that FISC judges review, including specific warrants
for surveillance.374  This version of FISA did not require a warrant or
judicial review for foreign intelligence surveillance conducted on American
citizens overseas. 375 However, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 has
changed FISA to cover this large group of American citizens. 376 While
extending this important protective statute to cover surveillance of
Americans overseas, Congress also rolled back much of the individualized
judicial review of surveillance that made FISA a satisfactory compromise
between national security interests and privacy protections. 377 To best
protect all of these important interests, FISA should once again be amended
to provide specific warrant review for all foreign intelligence surveillance
of Americans.
365. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
367. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
369. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
370. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
371. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
372. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
375. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
376. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
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B. A Specific Warrant Procedure for Conducting Surveillance of
Americans Overseas
This Note proposes modest changes to the current procedure for
approving foreign intelligence surveillance. When the Church Committee
issued its report and recommendations on the intelligence operations of the
United States, they created FISA, a compromise that provided judicial
review of foreign intelligence surveillance targeting Americans while also
protecting the secrecy of sensitive national security information. 37 8 FISA is
based upon the belief that, though the executive may protect the country
through reasonable surveillance practices, the legislature may regulate this
surveillance with a warrant process.
379
Between the years 1978, when Congress first passed FISA, and 2002,
when President Bush authorized a surveillance program that circumvented
FISA, FISA was an effective judicial review process for foreign intelligence
surveillance. 380 While it is tempting to blame the inconvenience of FISA
for the failure of U.S. intelligence agencies to detect foreign terrorists
operating in the United States in the years prior to the 9/11 attacks, the
FISC has given great deference to the needs of intelligence agencies and did
not hinder intelligence gathering that would have prevented the 9/11
attacks. 38 1
The challenges and threats facing the United States are arguably greater
than those that the country faced in 1978. As more years pass since the
deadly 9/11 attacks, there is a danger of tipping the scales too far back
toward the direction of privacy and civil liberties without allowing
intelligence agencies the freedom to pursue legitimate threats and protect
the national security. 382 There is still much international turmoil and there
are many active national security threats. However, it is misguided to say
that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the constant threat of international
terrorism require the government to give more power to the President while
infringing citizens' civil liberties. 38 3 The U.S. courts and legislature should
be allowed to regulate executive overreaching even during perilous times.
It is the position of this Note that allowing intelligence agencies and the
executive to be controlled by only self-imposed restrictions is not an
adequate safeguard for the rights of Americans. 384 Therefore, this Note
recommends that FISA, with specific warrant review renewed, and covering
surveillance of American citizens living overseas, would more adequately
protect the rights of Americans worldwide than the current version of FISA.
378. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
379. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
380. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
382. MuscH, supra note 67, at 3.
383. There have always been external threats facing the country, but civil liberties must
be protected despite these problems. See Kitrosser, supra note 118, at 1201 (noting that the
Founders were aware that their new nation could collapse at any moment because of strife
and because of foreign sympathizers living among them).
384. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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1. The Court
The FISC satisfies many of the concerns that the executive and courts
had with allowing judicial review of foreign intelligence surveillance. The
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court selects the members of the FISC from
the pool of federal judges appointed by the President. 385 The executive is
allowed to brief judges on the necessity of a FISA warrant and thus is able
to help judges in their decisions. 386 Complicated foreign affairs analysis
should not be beyond the capabilities of the experienced federal judges
appointed to the FISC.387 Because they are chosen by the Chief Justice,
leaks can be somewhat prevented by choosing judges who are considered
particularly trustworthy. Thus, the FISC removes many of the executive's
concerns about submitting warrant applications to a federal court.
2. The Warrant Procedure
Because FISA, as amended in 2008, created a warrant-approval
procedure for surveillance of Americans overseas, it is possible for the
FISC to issue warrants for searches and surveillance overseas. 388 These
warrants act as a "shield" rather than a "key" and would have no efficacy in
a foreign jurisdiction.389 However, warrants do provide protection from
arbitrary intrusions by the U.S. government against American citizens
living overseas. 390
FISA's procedure for reviewing foreign intelligence surveillance, prior to
the 2008 amendments, was an effective method for facilitating beneficial
intelligence collection while also protecting Americans from the most
egregious invasions of privacy.39 1  By requiring intelligence or law
enforcement agencies to submit warrant requests to the Justice Department,
the government solved some potential problems. 392 First, it provided an
extra check on the legitimacy of surveillance requests.393  Second, it
removed some of the most unnecessary warrant requests, minimizing the
administrative burden on the FISC.394
A FISA warrant request should accurately and specifically describe the
necessity, the target, and the means of the surveillance. 395 The specificity
of the warrant serves a few functions. First, historical evidence suggests
that one purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to eliminate general
385. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
386. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
387. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
388. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
389. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
390. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
391. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
392. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
394. See supra Part II.B.3.f.
395. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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warrants and the concomitant privacy abuses that these warrants enabled.396
Thus, by requiring specific warrants, the government is conforming with
the likely intent of the Framers. 397 Second, when a warrant request is
specific, it prevents overinclusive searches that go beyond the scope of their
necessity.3 98 The government should use surveillance only when it is
necessary and minimize the scope of the surveillance to reduce privacy
intrusions.399 The Highlander surveillance in the Middle East is an example
of beneficial surveillance that is overbroad and unnecessarily invades
privacy. 400 Specific warrants tailor the scope of surveillance and provide a
clear directive to surveillance analysts.40 1
Next, it is important that the FISC subjects each search warrant to
judicial review. Under the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Congress
removed this important step in the FISA process in favor of more
generalized judicial oversight.402  This type of judicial scrutiny is
inadequate. It essentially replaces judicial review with the type of executive
good faith certifications that proved to be an inadequate protection of
Americans' privacy rights prior to FISA's enactment.40 3 Judicial scrutiny
of warrant requests provides a proper check on executive-surveillance
authorization and better protects Americans' privacy rights.40 4
3. The Effect of the Warrants
One practical concern is, if the government issues warrants for searches
and surveillance overseas, which governments do these warrants bind?40 5
The most likely answer to this question is that the warrants are binding only
on the U.S. government itself.40 6 A warrant acts as both a "shield" and a
"key. 40 7  The "key" function seems unrealistic in a foreign jurisdiction
because the United States cannot expect that other countries with different
governments and different legal systems will honor warrants issued in the
United States. 408 The only way to create legally effective warrants in a
foreign nation would be through a treaty negotiated by the executive. 40 9
However, obtaining permission to enter a home or to conduct surveillance
is not the only function of a warrant. A warrant also acts effectively against
the United States, protecting the privacy of American citizens.410 This type
396. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
397. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
398. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
399. See supra Introduction.
400. See supra Introduction.
401. See supra Introduction.
402. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
403. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
404. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
405. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
406. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
407. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
408. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
409. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
410. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
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of warrant would be an effective safeguard against unnecessary intrusions
of Americans' privacy.
4. Exceptions to a FISA Warrant Requirement for Americans Overseas
A warrant requirement is always subject to exceptions. 4 11 It is logical
that the warrant requirement for surveillance of Americans overseas should
also be subject to many of the same exceptions. The most important
warrant exception for foreign intelligence surveillance is the exigent
circumstances exception.4 12  The United States' intelligence agencies,
military, and law enforcement personnel must be able to respond to national
security threats with speed and efficiency. Therefore, any FISA warrant
requirement should include an exigent circumstances exception.4 13
Beginning surveillance under this exception should not end the judicial
scrutiny of foreign intelligence surveillance. There should still be
accountability when the government uses the exigent circumstances
exception. Though the threat may be imminent enough that it necessarily
means that the delay of seeking prior judicial approval is unreasonable,
once the necessary surveillance begins it should be easy to have the FISC
quickly review the surveillance's necessity and minimization precautions.
The original FISA rules required approval of surveillance initiated under
the exigent circumstances exception within seventy-two hours. 4 14
However, the most recent FISA amendments have extended the period for
approval of surveillance begun under exigent circumstances to seven
days. 4 15 A period of warrantless surveillance should be minimized because
there is a significant risk that warrantless surveillance unnecessarily invades
Americans' privacy. This risk is necessary where there is a dire threat to
national security. But it is important that an impartial party assesses
whether this threat actually exists and if the surveillance is beneficial.
Another necessary exception to the warrant requirement should be
surveillance conducted as part of an American war effort. The rules of
surveillance of civilians should not apply when the government is acting to
obtain surveillance for the war efforts of the United States military. In this
scenario there should be few situations where Americans are surveillance
targets of the U.S. military. To the extent that the Highlander surveillance
was necessary military surveillance confined to Iraq and Afghanistan and
conducted to protect American troops, the surveillance was justifiable.
NSA surveillance targeting Americans in other parts of the Middle East,
when not responding to an immediate threat, however, is unreasonable
unless the NSA submits to prior judicial review of the surveillance.
411. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
412. See supra notes 337-40 and accompanying text.
413. See supra notes 337-40 and accompanying text.
414. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
415. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
It is not enough for a country to state its intention to uphold certain basic
rights. The Founders knew that a government must include internal checks
and balances to ensure the protection of important constitutional rights.
Privacy is a basic right, protected by the laws and Constitution of the
United States. While national security is an immensely important interest,
the government should not sacrifice all else while trying to protect it.
Warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance of Americans overseas is
not an evil act. It is the act of a government working hard to keep the
country safe. However, a better balance between the competing interests of
privacy and national security is necessary to preserve a truly free nation. It
will take a vigilant and conscientious government to achieve this balance.
Yet by looking to the Constitution for guidance, it is possible for the United
States to come closer to this essential equilibrium.
